International Crisis Group

Iranian president says nuclear deal with the west is getting closer | Julian Borger and Saeed Kamali Dehghan

President Hassan Rouhani has said that a nuclear deal with the west is getting closer, as a report emerged of a possible compromise between American and Iranian negotiators over uranium enrichment.

After meeting the heads of the country’s parliament and judiciary, Rouhani was quoted by the Mehr news agency as saying: “We have narrowed the gaps,” adding that although “some issues and differences remain … The west has realised that it should recognise the rights of the Iranian people.”

Even Ali Larijani, the parliamentary speaker and a noted hardliner on nuclear talks, declared himself “not pessimistic” about the trajectory of the negotiations.

Nuclear talks between Iran and six major powers are due to resume later this month in Geneva ahead of a March deadline for arriving at a basic framework agreement. A comprehensive permanent settlement would be reached by the end of June.

FULL ARTICLE (via The Guardian)

Photo: World Economic Forum/flickr

Iran Nuclear Talks: The Beginning of the Endgame? | Ali Vaez

After a year of negotiations, the parties to the Iran nuclear talks failed to meet their deadline of 24 November. Nonetheless the talks will continue, with the goal of reaching a political agreement by 1 March 2015 and a comprehensive agreement, including an implementation plan, by 1 July 2015 (see Crisis Group’s new report Iran Nuclear Talks: The Fog Recedes). In the following Q and A, Crisis Group Senior Iran Analyst Ali Vaez discusses what the new deadline means and how the talks might move forward.

There’s much disappointment about the failure to agree a deal that would solve Iran’s differences with the international community over its nuclear program. Are we better off than when these intense talks began 12 months ago, or not?

Ali: Yes, of course we’re better off. Going through the 11th hour enabled both sides to gain a better understanding of each other’s real positions. It wasn’t clear until the very end which were real red lines, and which were artificial, maximalist ones. Going forward, they won’t need so much brinksmanship. They can now discern each other’s core requirements, where they really can’t move, and issues where there is a grey area in which they can manoeuvre.

What’s the rationale for having such a long extension of the talks – until 1 July 2015?

Each time you extend the talks you have to pay a political price for it, so they thought it was safer to go with a longer extension with the aim of reaching a deal as soon as possible. Also renewing it soon after the new U.S. Congress comes into office in January will be extremely difficult. Finally, there is the UN’s Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May 2015; all of the key negotiators and experts will be extremely busy with that, which is held only every five years. Add to it Christmas and Iranian New Year holidays, and you’ll see that it actually is not that long.

FULL INTERVIEW (Crisis Group Blog - In Pursuit of Peace)

Photo: Crisis Group

Iran Nuclear Talks: The Fog Recedes

Istanbul/Vienna/Brussels  |   10 Dec 2014

This media release is also available in: Farsi

When twelve months of intense negotiations between Iran and the P5+1/EU3+3 ended with yet another extension, sceptics saw this as confirmation that the talks are doomed. But it would be as grave a mistake to underestimate the real progress as to overstate the chances of ultimate success. A landmark agreement is still within reach if both sides adopt more flexible postures on enrichment capacity and sanctions relief. 

Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, also known as the EU3+3) failed to reach a comprehensive nuclear agreement by their self-imposed 24 November deadline but have made considerable progress in the past twelve months. Though both sides expressed their political constraints and irreducible requirements for a deal more clearly than before, two core differences remain: the size of Iran’s enrichment capacity and sanctions relief. In its latest briefing, Iran Nuclear Talks: The Fog Recedes, the International Crisis Group sheds light on deficiencies of the talks thus far, examines both sides’ concerns and redlines, and argues that an accord can still be reached without violating either side’s core principles and interests.

The briefing’s major findings and recommendations are:

• Iran’s redlines are two-fold: recognition of its right to industrial-scale enrichment and that any irreversible concessions it makes will be met with commensurate relief on sanctions, specifically their termination, not just suspension. For its part, the P5+1 insists on denying Iran a breakout time – the interval required to enrich enough fissile material for one weapon – of less than a year and on maintaining the sanctions architecture, even if some are suspended, for the duration of the comprehensive agreement.

• To expedite talks, Iran and the U.S. should immediately reactivate a quiet diplomatic channel to find a solution that takes into account their respective domestic constraints and core interests. In parallel, France, Germany and the UK should join forces to alleviate the concerns of the U.S. Congress, Israel and Arab states by clearly explaining the merits of an agreement and bolstering their security and strategic cooperation.

• Both sides are excessively concerned with the number of centrifuges permitted by a putative agreement. Iran will have no need for its currently operational enrichment capacity in the near future; the West has no reason to fear an Iranian breakout in declared and closely monitored facilities with a limited number of centrifuges.

• There is a credible path to a long-lasting deal. It would require Iran to postpone its plans for industrial-scale enrichment while the P5+1 countenances controlled growth of that enrichment program and clearly defines target dates for a phased lifting of sanctions. The U.S. Congress should refrain from passing new sanctions that could undermine the diplomatic process and erode the P5+1’s unity.

“As pressures build in Washington and Tehran, and the region endures horrific instability and violence, the status quo might not be sustainable for long”, says Ali Vaez, Iran Senior Analyst. “Without tangible progress, even if the talks survive outside pressure until 1 July, another extension will damage the parties’ credibility and drastically diminish their chances of success”.

“There is no reason to be pollyannaish, but neither is there any reason to write off the talks when the parties have just had their most fruitful exchanges”, says Robert Blecher, Acting Middle East Program Director. “With patience, persistence, creativity and sufficient will, an agreement is within reach”.

FULL POLICY BRIEFING

Reports propose compromise for Iran nuclear deal | Laura Rozen

As negotiators from Iran and six world powers prepare to resume talks next month, two new papers by prominent arms-control experts close to the negotiations offer prescriptions for how to overcome key obstacles to reach a nuclear deal.

The new papers, by former US nuclear negotiator Robert Einhorn, the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the Arms Control Association (ACA), propose a compromise that would have Iran agree to reduce the size of its enrichment program in the near term while allowing it to conduct research on more efficient centrifuges. That would enable Iran to expand its enrichment capacity for energy purposes after the deal expires, if Iran still desires to. The new reports seem to reflect a convergence of expert opinion on possible compromise solutions for a deal.

FULL ARTICLE (Al Monitor)

Photo: Bundesministerium fur Europa, Integration und Ausseres/flickr

Iran and the P5+1: Getting to “Yes”

Istanbul/Tehran/Washington/Brussels  |   27 Aug 2014

November’s deadline could be the last chance to avoid a breakdown in the Iran and the P5+1 nuclear talks. Compromise on Iran’s enrichment capacity is key to ending the impasse, requiring both sides to walk back from maximalist positions and focus on realistic solutions. 

Despite significant headway in negotiations over the past six months, Iran and the P5+1 (U.S., UK, Russia, China, France and Germany) remain far apart on fundamental issues. In its latest briefing, Iran and the P5+1: Getting to “Yes”, the International Crisis Group argues that both sides have forgotten the lessons that brought them this far. They have wrongly assumed that desperation for a deal would soften their rival’s bottom line and compel it to ignore its domestic political constraints. The result is a dangerous game of brinkmanship that, if continued, will yield only failure. Though there is little room for error and no time to waste, a workable compromise is still possible. Iran and the P5+1: Getting to “Yes”, Crisis Group’s latest briefing, building on the 40-point plan for a nuclear accord it detailed in May, explores a half year of talks, investigates the new realities facing negotiators and offers an innovative way out of the impasse.

The briefing’s major findings and recommendations are:

• Iran and the P5+1 should find common ground by reverse-engineering political concerns underlying their technical differences. For Iran, this means a meaningful enrichment program; continued scientific advancement; and tangible sanctions relief. For the P5+1, this requires a firewall between Iran’s civilian and potential military nuclear capabilities; ironclad monitoring mechanisms; and sufficient time and cooperation to build trust.

• Iran should accept more quantitative constraints on the number of its centrifuges and postpone plans for industrial-scale enrichment. In return, the P5+1 should accept the continuation of qualitative growth of Tehran’s enrichment capacity through research and development.

• Iran should commit to using Russian-supplied nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactor for its entire lifetime, in return for stronger Russian guarantees of supply and enhanced P5+1 nuclear cooperation, especially on nuclear fuel fabrication. This would gradually prepare Tehran to assume responsibility for a possible additional plant, or plants, by the end of the agreement, in eleven to sixteen years.

• An accord should be based on realistic, substantive milestones such as the time the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needs to investigate Iran’s past nuclear activities ­ to determine the duration of the final agreement’s several phases rather than subjective ones dictated by political calendars.

“Neither side’s arguments bear scrutiny in the debate over the number of centrifuges, because the roots of their differences are fundamentally political”, says Ali Vaez, Iran Senior Analyst. “Negotiators are both driven and constrained by their respective domestic politics, especially the U.S. and Iran, where powerful constituencies remain skeptical of the negotiations and have the leverage to derail them”.

“The moment of truth for Iran and the P5+1 has arrived. Should it be lost, it is unlikely to soon reappear”, says Robert Blecher, Acting Middle East Program Director. “The parties could allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good and watch the best opportunity to resolve this crisis devolve into a mutually harmful spiral of escalation. Or they could choose wisely”.

FULL REPORT

Amid push for Iran nuclear deal, 2 sides maneuver to shift any blame | Paul Richter

Six world powers and Iran began a three-week push Wednesday to complete a deal aimed at stopping Tehran from building a nuclear bomb, but they also started positioning themselves to deflect blame if negotiations collapse.

With the talks in Vienna gridlocked since mid-May, senior Iranian and U.S. officials have stepped up claims that they made every effort to reach a compromise while the other side pressed unrealistic demands that made an agreement impossible.

After Secretary of State John F. Kerry wrote an op-ed article urging Iran to make new concessions, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif put out a YouTube video Wednesday in which he said the West pursued “a game of chicken in an attempt to extract last-minute concessions.”

FULL ARTICLE (L.A. Times)

Photo: European External Action Service/flickr

False Dilemmas in the Iran Talks | Ali Vaez

Despite some stumbles, the Iran nuclear talks resuming in Vienna this week may yet yield an accord that could end the prolonged crisis. But the promise of success could turn into colossal failure, particularly if both sides cling to equally dubious preoccupations over “breakout time” and “irreversible sanctions relief.”

The nuclear talks have a “very real chance,” as President Obama put it, of yielding a deal. This is mostly because last year the parties finally got beyond the faux obstacle of Iran’s claim of its “right to enrichment.” For nearly a decade, diplomatic forays to resolve the Iranian crisis went nowhere. Tehran, in a hair-splitting interpretation, claimed that the right to enrichment is enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which it is a party. The West countered that there was no such right—and even if there were, Iran had forfeited it by violating its obligations.

The disagreement was a chimera. There is no resolution to it in the NPT. The legalistic quarrel cloaked the real issue: the geostrategic rivalry between Iran and the West.

The parties eventually acknowledged this, after years of mutual escalation that only brought them closer to conflict, not to their objectives. Both reconceptualized the issue. Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif announced last fall, “We see no need for [Iran’s right to enrichment] to be recognized as ‘a right,’ because this right is inalienable.” The West, in turn, implicitly recognized that no agreement is possible unless it allows Iran to retain some enrichment capability.

Thus, the conceptual obstacle, apparently insurmountable, was bypassed. The landmark interim agreement signed last November halted the prolonged race of sanctions against centrifuges. It also created breathing space for tackling longer-term concerns, including Iran’s future uranium-enrichment capacity and sanctions relief.

But now that the parties are negotiating a comprehensive agreement, they have trapped themselves in a new debate—again an artificial one. The P5+1 is obsessed with the concept of “breakout time,” the time required to enrich enough uranium to weapons grade for one bomb. To lengthen it, the group is trying to define Iran’s “practical needs” for enriched uranium as minimally as possible. By contrast, Iran, having invested enormous resources and pride in its enrichment program, is trying to define those needs in maximal terms.

The negotiations will not get far debating over “needs,” which are ultimately a matter of interpretation. By the same token, breakout calculations are rough and purely theoretical guesstimates. They ignore time-consuming preparatory steps, inevitable technical glitches, the unpredictable weaponization process, the strategic and military illogic of breaking out with a single untested weapon, and the many convolutions of political decision making. Reducing a complex process to a one-dimensional race against time distorts reality, and overlooks competing interests and the natural tendency to avoid risk—including the nonnegligible risk of being caught.

In any conceivable final agreement, rigorous monitoring mechanisms would significantly increase the chance of immediately detecting any attempt to reconfirm how centrifuges are interconnected—a necessary step for enriching to weapons grade and the first in a breakout. Under the eyes of the UN nuclear watchdog, any such venture would have to be brazen and thus constitute the kind of infringement likely to expedite and, to some extent, legitimize a firm response.

Defining a tolerable breakout limit is thus less a technical exercise than a political judgment; as a metric, it is an unrealistic basis for a durable agreement and sound policy.

Iran, meanwhile, is committed to a different yet equally unhelpful idea: the reversibility of sanctions relief. Arguing that suspending (as opposed to lifting) U.S. sanctions would leave Tehran vulnerable to congressional activism or changing political winds in Washington, it is willing to discuss only measures that would permanently lift sanctions. In reality, however, no measures can be permanent, as Congress can reimpose sanctions at will. Nor are Iran’s nuclear concessions any more irreversible, given the country’s now-indigenous know-how.

It might be too late to eliminate these unhelpful concepts, as they have become mainstream. What is needed, rather, is a compromise that satisfies both sides’ irreducible, bottom-line requirements: for Iran, a meaningful enrichment program, continued scientific advancement and tangible sanctions relief; for the P5+1, a firewall between Iran’s civilian and potential military nuclear capabilities, airtight monitoring mechanisms, and sufficient time and Iranian cooperation to establish the exclusively peaceful nature of the country’s nuclear program. Such a solution would enable both parties to sell the deal at home and would serve as a springboard to a different kind of relationship.

The only way to clinch this elusive deal is for both sides to acknowledge the price the other has paid for accumulating its leverage. The P5+1 must come to terms with the fact that it will not be able to diminish Iran’s enrichment program to irrelevance. Similarly, Iran should understand that sanctions will not dissipate overnight. Otherwise, what appears as an opportunity will turn out to be a mirage.

Ali Vaez is the International Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Iran.

ORIGINAL ARTICLE (The National Interest)

Photo: UN Geneva/flickr