Hagel Leaves Successor With Two Wars Obama Pledged to End | David Lerman, Eltaf Najafizada and Aziz Alwan
Departing U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel will hand his successor two intractable wars that President Barack Obama had promised to end.
The battles against Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and against the Taliban and its allies in Afghanistan show no sign of abating, much less ending, as Obama announced today that he’s nominating Ashton Carter, who spent more than two years as the Pentagon’s No. 2 civilian leader, as his next defense chief.
In Afghanistan, now America’s longest war, the capital city of Kabul has become a battleground for daily bombings. At least 10 attacks late last month killed scores of victims and led to the resignation of the city’s police chief. Obama has quietly authorized a continuation of offensive air and ground operations in 2015 to protect U.S. forces.
In Iraq, the war Obama thought he had ended in 2011, the rise of Islamic State terrorists has forced the president to authorize a renewed air war over Iraq and Syria and the return of a growing number of American troops on the ground.
A number of U.S. officials, who discussed policy disputes on condition of anonymity, say that’s not enough. So do outside analysts such as Anthony Cordesman.
“The Obama administration has yet to demonstrate that it has a successful strategy or plan for dealing with any of these wars,” Cordesman, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, wrote in a report this week titled, “The Obama Administration: From Ending Two Wars to Engagement in Five – with the Risk of a Sixth.”
FULL ARTICLE (Bloomberg)
Photo: DOD Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley/Chuck Hagel/flickr
DNI Clapper’s Rescue Mission to the DPRK | Daniel Pinkston
On 8 November 2014, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea released U.S. citizens Kenneth Bae and Matthew Miller into the custody of James Clapper, the director of national intelligence (DNI), for a return flight to the United States. Bae had been detained for two years after being convicted by a DPRK court for committing “hostile acts against the DPRK”. Bae, a Christian missionary, was suspected of having proselytised against the regime, calling for a “religious coup d’état”. Miller was arrested in April 2014 and convicted in September 2014, also for committing “hostile acts against the DPRK”. Miller reportedly tore up his tourist visa upon arrival at Pyongyang’s Sunan International Airport and asked for political asylum.
Some people expressed surprise at the sudden release of Bae and Miller. But Jeffrey Fowle, another detained American citizen, was released in late October. Fowle had been arrested for allegedly leaving a Bible in the toilet at the Ch’ŏngjin Seamen’s Club, a restaurant and bar for foreign sailors (and North Koreans with cash). Clearly, the detention of the Americans no longer served the purposes of the regime, but Pyongyang apparently requested a visit by a high-level U.S. government official before agreeing to their release. The Obama administration would have been sensitive about sending a high-level official because of possible criticism at home and because Pyongyang could manipulate the visit for propaganda purposes. The administration pointed out that DNI James Clapper was selected for the mission to emphasise that the visit was not to include broader diplomatic discussions.
FULL COMMENTARY (In Pursuit of Peace Crisis Group Blog)
Photo: Reuters/Anthony Bolante
Resetting Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan
Islamabad/Brussels | 28 Oct 2014
As Pakistan seeks to consolidate its fragile democracy, it should seize the moment to improve relations with its Afghan neighbour. Its biggest challenge comes from within. The civilian government has to regain control over national security and foreign policy from the military.
In its latest report, Resetting Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan, the International Crisis Group examines the opportunities and constraints faced by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government as it attempts to improve a deeply troubled relationship with Kabul. Realising that his goal to stabilise Pakistan’s faltering economy will remain elusive in the absence of security, Sharif has reached out to Afghanistan, hoping to reduce bilateral tensions and contribute to stabilising post-transition Afghanistan, and thus improving Pakistan’s own stability. But Sharif’s approach, welcomed by the incoming Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, faces serious challenges at home.
The report’s major findings and recommendations are:
“Pakistan’s civilian leadership is well aware that the country’s security is best served by a stable Afghanistan. It has taken some initial steps toward stronger bilateral ties and should continue on this path”, says Samina Ahmed, South Asia Project Director and Senior Asia Adviser. “If Afghanistan stabilises, so will its economy, with the resultant expansion in bilateral and transit trade benefiting Pakistan”.
“The civilian leadership’s preference for peace with Kabul sharply contrasts with the military’s hedging strategies”, says Jonathan Prentice, Crisis Group’s Chief Policy Officer and Acting Asia Program Director. “As the democratic transition consolidates, stronger civilian control over national security and foreign policy will create fresh opportunities to more constructively reset the relationship with Afghanistan”.
Baghdad and Erbil Battle for Iraq | The National Interest
By Joost R. Hiltermann
The August 1 announcement by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that it was ready to resume oil exports through the Iraqi pipeline after a four-month suspension concluded what was rather like a nasty school-yard brawl in the manner such scuffles invariably end: with a bloody nose and some tears. Will a handshake soon follow?
The federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdish government in Erbil long have been at loggerheads over a range of issues that, at their core, concern the nature of Iraq’s federal system and the Kurdish region’s future. They disagree especially over the extent of the region’s powers, including the authority to sign oil contracts; the status of territories claimed by the Kurds as part of Kurdistan; and payment for the Kurds’ regional guard force as well as federal budget allocations more generally. Although the 2005 constitution addresses these questions, its many ambiguities and gaps make it subject to varying interpretations. Both sides have employed these weapons to great effect.
The conflict escalated sharply late last year when ExxonMobil became the first major oil company to sign with the Kurdistan Regional Government, then aggravated the situation by taking exploration blocks located squarely in disputed territories. The Iraqi government threatened to punish the company, which holds significant concessions in the South, but has yet to take any concrete retaliatory steps. Instead, Chevron, Total and Gazprom have now followed in ExxonMobil’s footsteps, with others queuing up.
With the Kurdish region’s growing production potential, the question has been how the oil will get to market in the absence of a federal hydrocarbons law and as long as relations between Baghdad and Erbil remain as deeply frayed as they have been. For now, Baghdad controls the export pipeline, but the KRG hopes that, with Turkey’s consent, it will be able to skirt the Baghdad-controlled pipeline and pump the oil northward once the necessary infrastructure has been built. In the words of the KRG’s mineral-resources minister Ashti Hawrami, “The oil will flow… . When you have one million barrels a day stranded, it will find its way to the market despite the political haggling.”
Earlier this year, an agreement signed by the federal and Kurdish governments in February 2011 broke apart over Erbil’s allegation that Baghdad had failed to compensate fully the three companies with KRG contracts that have put oil into the export pipeline. Baghdad declared itself ready to pay but said it was awaiting expense receipts from the KRG for an audit; Erbil replied it had given Baghdad all it needed. The matter reached an impasse when, on April 1, the KRG pulled the plug on its exports, saying it would resume them only once Baghdad coughed up the money it owed and pledged to make future payments in a timely manner.
FULL ARTICLE (The National Interest)
Photo: The U.S. Army/Flickr