International Crisis Group
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Ending The LRA: Reason For Optimism And Political Commitment
Ned Dalby
Infrequent observers of central Africa are startled and appalled to learn that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group that emerged in the late 1980s, is still killing. Forced into the border zones of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan, its brutality can no longer be framed as political protest but rather survival by its own awful, time-tested method.
However, military and civilian efforts to stop the LRA are gaining momentum and there is now a precious opportunity to end the nightmare of thousands. To make the most of it, African leaders and foreign partners should commit to an immediate military push and measures to help traumatised communities recover in the long-term.
In late 2008 Joseph Kony, the group’s leader, refused to sign a peace deal with the Ugandan government. Talks collapsed and the Ugandan army botched a US-backed assault on the LRA’s camps in north-eastern DRC. Since then it has been trying to catch Kony and scattered, highly mobile groups of fighters in dense forest.
The political agendas of the region’s leaders have made a difficult job even harder. Since the LRA no longer presents an immediate threat to Ugandans, there is understandably little domestic pressure on Museveni to invest the men and money needed to complete the mission. He has prioritised other more politically rewarding goals, including his re-election in February 2011 and beefing up the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In mid-2010 he pulled out about half the troops assigned to the operation. The campaign of attrition became markedly more passive and for months was little more than a cordon preventing the LRA’s return to Uganda. Local armies meanwhile have neither the will nor the strength to protect their people, let alone hunt down Kony’s fighters.
The DRC’s tolerance of a Ugandan military presence on its soil has been exhausted. During the second Congo war (1998-2003) Uganda occupied part of Congo’s territory, plundered its natural resources and earned President Joseph Kabila’s lasting mistrust. A deeply engrained animosity has seen the Congolese army deny the Ugandans access to LRA areas and in October 2011 forbid them to leave camp, reportedly on pain of death. Most of the LRA is in the CAR but could cross back into Congo at any time and find safe haven.
The LRA is inevitably a low priority for the governments of Uganda, the DRC, CAR and South Sudan sitting hundreds of kilometres away in country capitals. But an outcry from local civil society and pressure from human rights groups, particularly in the U.S, has made it difficult for western partners to stand idle.
Under direction from Congress, the US. government has committed to using political, economic, military and intelligence means to eliminate the LRA threat. The deployment in late 2011 of about 100 troops to Uganda, a minority of which have now advanced to south east CAR to advise and assist the Ugandans, is the clearest expression of US commitment to the fight.
The African Union (AU) is also in the process of launching its “regional cooperation initiative” to end the LRA. The three countries affected by Kony’s violence pushed the AU to the fore hoping it would bring in more funding. Looking to promote African ownership, the US also encouraged it. The AU’s limited capacity and difficulty reconciling the demands of affected member states and those of its main backer, the EU, have delayed the launch. But in November 2011 the AU appointed a special envoy to muster political will on the LRA issue and plans to reframe the operation as a “regional intervention force” thereby investing it with greater legitimacy.
US support, the AU initiative and other international interventions have now advanced far enough to present a genuine collective opportunity to end the LRA in the near future and enable afflicted communities to rebuild their lives in the long-term.
The U.S. military advisers in the field have the chance to embolden and strengthen Ugandan operations, in particular by improving communications and coordination among the troops and with host armies. But they will not be there long; just a matter of months according to US officials. While their expertise is on hand, while most LRA fighters are in the CAR and while the dry season allows for easier movement, the Ugandans should launch a concerted military push against the LRA, at all times prioritising civilian safety and accepting strict accountability for their actions.
As an essential complement to military pressure, the UN mission in Congo uses leaflets and radio messages to persuade LRA fighters and captives to leave the bush. Defectors say it works. The UN should take advantage of a healthy appetite among donors for such non-military measures and expand and intensify them as quickly as possible.
The UN, present in DRC, CAR and South Sudan, should also agree with government, military and humanitarian actors on procedures by which escapees are debriefed, taken home and helped to restart their lives. It should iron out unnecessary delays and funding gaps to be ready for greater numbers in the future. Assisting returnees should dovetail with long-term government and donor plans for stimulating social and economic recovery in hard-hit, border-zone communities.
For these collective efforts to come off, regional leaders, Museveni and Kabila in particular, will need to show their commitment to military and civilian efforts and cooperate. In particular, Kabila will need to allow Ugandan operations on Congolese soil and Museveni ensure his forces behave with total professionalism. It falls to Francisco Madeira, the AU special envoy, western partners and the UN to work with both on these issues.
Hoping for the best but planning for the worst, the AU should recognise the need to maintain political support among African leaders and international donors for comprehensive military and civilian efforts in the long-term, especially if domestic pressure sees the US reduce its role. This political commitment is critical to beating the LRA and enabling thousands of vulnerable families to live without fear.
Ned Dalby is Central Africa Analyst for the International Crisis Group.
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Led by Joseph Kony, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has terrorized Central Africa for decades. Central Africa analyst Ned Dalby explains why a unique opportunity might exist now to end the LRA insurgency for good.
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Epoch Times: End Game Looms For Dreaded Central African Militia
By Aron Lamm
Time may be running out for The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the notorious central African militant group, which has been terrorizing the rural population of several countries for more the two decades. A new joint effort between the United States, The African Union, and the impacted African nations (South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and the Central African Republic) is underway.
But according to a new report from the International Crisis Group (ICG), political will, coordination, and tenacity is essential for this effort to be more successful than previous attempts.
The LRA, which came into being in Uganda in the late 1980s, is one of the most notorious and enigmatic militant groups in the world today.
It began as an insurgency against the Ugandan government, but has morphed into a criminal terrorist gang without a clear agenda, supporting itself by attacking villages in remote areas around the shared borders of what is today South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and Uganda.
Attempts were made beginning in 2005 to negotiate a peaceful settlement between the Ugandan government and the LRA, but this broke down in 2008 when leader Joseph Kony refused to leave the bush to sign the draft agreement. Since then, the LRA has been responsible for the deaths of at least 2,400 civilians, the abduction of more than 3,400, and causing 440,000 to flee, according to the report “The Lord Resistance Army: End Game?” released on Nov. 17 by the ICG.
Still led by Kony, the group is a strange mix of militia and cult. Claiming to be Christian, as well as fighting for the Acholi ethnic group, the LRA has become infamous for its plundering of villages, rape, torture, and mutilating and killing or abducting civilians for the purpose of forced labor, forced militia recruitment, or sex slavery. They are especially feared for their widespread use of child soldiers.
The ICG report states that the LRA remains “a deadly threat to civilians” in the CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan.
But after failed attempts in recent years by the Ugandan government to stamp out the movement, the broader, U.S.-supported coalition is underway. President Obama has committed 100 troops to support the effort, mainly by training and advising African forces.
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The Lord’s Resistance Army: End Game?
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remains a deadly threat to civilians in three Central African states. After a ceasefire and negotiations for peaceful settlement of the generation-long insurgency broke down in 2008, Uganda’s army botched an initial assault. In three years since, half-hearted operations have failed to stop the small, brutally effective band from killing more than 2,400 civilians, abducting more than 3,400 and causing 440,000 to flee. In 2010 President Museveni withdrew about half the troops to pursue more politically rewarding goals. Congolese mistrust hampers current operations, and an African Union (AU) initiative has been slow to start. While there is at last a chance to defeat the LRA, both robust military action and vigorous diplomacy is required. Uganda needs to take advantage of new, perhaps brief, U.S. engagement by reinvigorating the military offensive; Washington needs to press regional leaders for cooperation; above all, the AU must act promptly to live up to its responsibilities as guarantor of continental security. When it does, Uganda and the U.S. should fold their efforts into the AU initiative.
The Ugandan army’s attempt in December 2008 to crush the LRA, originally an insurgency in northern Uganda but now a deadly, multinational criminal and terror band, by destroying its camps in north-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) went badly wrong. Joseph Kony, the group’s leader, escaped and quickly organised reprisals that left hundreds of civilians dead in the following months. The U.S.-backed Operation Lightning Thunder became a campaign of attrition, as the Ugandan army began hunting small, scattered and highly mobile groups of fighters in thick forest. It followed them into South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) and scored some early successes, but the operation lost steam in mid-2010, allowing the LRA to go on plundering villages and seizing hundreds of captives and new recruits in the tri-border area. As the UN Security Council agreed on 14 November 2011, this must stop.
The reasons for military failure are at root political. Museveni scaled down the operation to pursue other ventures he felt would win him greater political capital at home and abroad. Since the LRA has not been able to operate within Uganda for years and no longer endangers its security, few opposition politicians or community leaders there demand its defeat. Efforts to pursue it in the DRC are dogged by the host’s refusal to cooperate and grant access to LRA-affected areas. Uganda invaded in the late 1990s, plundered DRC resources and earned President Kabila’s lasting mistrust. As Congolese elections, still scheduled for late 2011, draw near, the army has demanded the Ugandans pull out and, while waiting for the official decision, forbidden them to leave camp. Most LRA senior commanders and fighters are now in the CAR but could return to the DRC at any time and, with the Ugandans restrained, find safe haven. CAR President Bozizé distrusts Uganda’s army, envies its U.S. support, has ordered it to withdraw from diamond areas and could hamper operations further unless satisfied his own army is benefiting.
There is no prospect of a negotiated end to the LRA problem, given the collapse of the multi-year Juba process and the lack of any apparent interest on the part of either Museveni or, especially, Kony to go that route again after three more years of fighting. Instead, the AU, under pressure from some member states and the U.S., announced in late 2010 that it would authorise a forceful mission against the LRA and coordinate regional efforts. A year and counting, however, planning has foundered over its inability to reconcile differences with and between key member states and donors. Uganda and the three directly affected countries hoped the AU initiative would open the door to more Western funding for their armies but are little interested in political guidance or civilian programs. The U.S. wanted the European Union (EU), the AU’s main donor, to share some of its burdens. However, the EU prefers the AU to act politically and is reluctant to finance the armies. Uganda resists ceding any of its military and policy freedom to the African regional body.
Frustrated with the ineffectiveness of Operation Lightning Thunder, the U.S. announced on 14 October that it would deploy about 100 troops to assist the Ugandan army – a majority to stay in Kampala, the rest to advise in the field. The move is part of a broader ramping up of its political and military engagement against the LRA. It has also offered to train more Congolese soldiers and has given equipment to the CAR army in order to win the operation political space. The few score field advisers should be able to improve the Ugandans’ performance. However, the Obama administration, a year from its own elections, is cautious about testing U.S. tolerance of another overseas military commitment. The deployment, it has made clear, will be short term.
The Ugandan army, even with U.S. advisers, is a flawed and uncertain instrument for defeating the LRA. Due to its record of abuses and failures to protect civilians, the governments and populations of the LRA-affected countries distrust it. That Kony no longer presents a direct threat to its interests leaves room for scepticism about Kampala’s political will to see the military job through to the end. But the Ugandan army is also essential, because no one else is prepared to send competent combat troops to do the job. U.S. support, both military and political, is important but may be short-lived. AU money and civilian programs are helpful but cannot stop LRA violence.
Uganda, with U.S. advice and support, should, therefore, lose no time in launching a reinvigorated attack on the LRA, if possible while most of the group’s senior commanders and fighters are still in the CAR and before they can return to the DRC’s more restrictive operational environment. A key part of the advice the U.S. should press on the Ugandan army is the need to prioritise protecting civilians, provide access to humanitarian agencies and accept stricter accountability for its actions.
At the same time, if this new activism is to succeed, the AU must break its political deadlock and put its initiative in play. Adding the AU to the equation is vital to rally the political commitment of Uganda, the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan by giving the undertaking clear continent-wide legitimacy. The central elements of the initiative should be appointment of a special envoy to smooth relations between Kinshasa and Kampala and authorisation of a multinational and multi-dimensional mission – what AU planners call the Regional Intervention Force (RIF). This will likely involve only those troop contributors presently engaged against the LRA, primarily the Ugandans, but should introduce a new, common operational and legal framework for the Ugandan and host armies and create new military structures to improve coordination between them. Once the RIF exists, their anti-LRA efforts should be placed under its umbrella.
The AU planners should work closely with the U.S. to ensure that from the start the African organisation’s initiative prioritises the same principles as Washington needs to press bilaterally on the Ugandan army. Donors, particularly the EU, should meanwhile fund complementary civilian work, especially to entice LRA fighters to leave the bush. Only such a multi-dimensional approach is likely to bring peace to the tri-border area and begin the slow task of healing the physical and social wounds the long LRA nightmare has inflicted.
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CNN: Five reasons why Lord’s Resistance Army remains on the loose
By Libby Lewis
President Barack Obama announced recently that about 100 U.S. troops are being deployed to Central Africa to help “apprehend and remove” the elusive Joseph Kony and his top commanders of the Lord’s Resistance Army.
It’s not the first time the United States has gone in to help put an end to the marauding, murdering gang known as the Lord’s Resistance Army – LRA, for short.
The LRA has butchered, enslaved and displaced people in Uganda and Central Africa for two decades. Although its brand of terrorism doesn’t target the United States, Washington has listed it as a terrorist group. The U.S. decision to help go after Kony is a strategic – as well as a humanitarian – one. Africa is a frontier for terrorism. Uganda is fighting Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia – which helps the United States – so in turn, the U.S. is helping Uganda fight the LRA.
The Lord’s Resistance Army began in northern Uganda in 1987 as an opposition force to leader Yoweri Museveni. Kony sees himself as a prophet who has said he wants to rule by following the Ten Commandments.
Instead, he has ruled – and thrived – by breaking a lot of those commandments. The Ugandan army – with the help of the U.S. military – has tried for years to take him and his leadership out. The International Criminal Court has had a warrant out for him since 2005.
The Lord’s Resistance Army replenishes its ranks by abducting villagers – men, women and children – brainwashing them and forcing them to fight. Or to serve as sex slaves for commanders. LRA members survive by staying on the move constantly and stealing food and provisions. Last month, according to researchers, an LRA band raided a village in the Democratic Republic of Congo soon after the World Food Programme had distributed food supplies there.
So what is LRA leader Kony’s secret? How has he evaded justice to operate his band of marauders and murderers with impunity for decades?
Here are five reasons some experts give:
1. He uses terror strategically.
You’ve probably seen photos of children whose noses or ears were cut off – because they didn’t obey the LRA’s orders. He’s forced children he’s abducted to kill their siblings or parents. (More: Woman recalls harrowing tale of captivity)
“They use very carefully thought-through strategies to have the biggest impact,” said Tim Allen, a professor at the London School of Economics and co-author of “The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality.”
“In northern Uganda in 2004,” Allen said, “they took some 20-odd women with their babies out of the displacement camp, laid them on the ground with their babies on their backs and smashed their brains in.”
And they did it at the edge of the camp – so that everyone in the camp would see.
“They didn’t do that very often,” Allen said. “But you don’t have to do that sort of thing very often to have a large impact on a lot of people.”
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2. Kony exploits regional politics and borders.
He got support from the Sudanese government for years. And the LRA uses borders as a defense: It hasn’t been in Uganda for years. That’s made it hard for the Ugandan army to pursue Kony. The militia is split and is constantly moving between the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and southern Sudan.
3. Uganda’s efforts to get Kony have flagged.
Uganda’s army has been stretched to the hilt, fighting Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia as part of an African Union force.
4. Kony is a smart strategist.
His band travels in small groups, and they’re a moving target. And he has informants – with cell phones. The last time the U.S. military helped Uganda go after Kony, in 2008, it used a traditional air and ground assault. Kony and his leaders escaped, then massacred hundreds of people in revenge. This time, the United States is bringing Special Forces (and probably other intelligence agents) with equipment and tactics to track him in the jungle.
5. Kony mixes military discipline with cultish charisma and spiritual tactics to keep captives in line – and sometimes, to keep the loyalty even of those who escape.
Allen, the London School of Economics professor, has talked to women who have escaped the Lord’s Resistance Army but are still loyal to their LRA “husbands.”
“He cultivates this image of himself as a medium for the power of the spirit and at other times, he presents himself as a ruthless military leader,” said Ned Dalby, Central Africa researcher with the International Crisis Group. “So he’s able to maintain cohesion as a group and maintain the loyalty of his fighters.”
Dalby said some former LRA fighters from northern Uganda have given a clue as to why some outside the group have stayed loyal to Kony.
“They expressed the feeling that because they were given a rank, they were given a certain purpose, and respect and authority,” Dalby said. “And then, once they’re outside the LRA, they find they’ve become just another poor person, trying to survive.”
