International Crisis Group

Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: Seeds of New Conflict?

Sanaa/Brussels, 4 April 2013: Yemen must take further steps to reform its security forces, or longstanding divisions could well undermine its political transition, which entered into a six-month “national dialogue” on 18 March.

Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: Seeds of a New Conflict?, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, analyses the corruption, impunity, tribal divisions and vested interests that have plagued Yemen’s security forces and now threaten the transition process in a country that is also engaged in an armed struggle with al-Qaeda-linked Islamist extremists. Restructuring the security forces must be accompanied by a larger effort to produce an inclusive political consensus – without which Yemen’s major security stakeholders are unlikely to accept critical reforms.

The report’s major findings and recommendations are:

• Fault lines within the security forces persist from the popular protest movement of 2011, when General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar threw his support behind protesters, while other commanders, mostly hailing from the family of then-president Saleh, remained loyal to the government.
• Since Saleh’s resignation, his successor, President Abdo Robo Mansour Hadi, has loosened the grip of the old regime, ordering a personnel shake-up and eliminating controversial military organisations commanded by General Mohsen and Saleh’s son. However, implementation is nascent, and reforms must go deeper than reshuffling individual positions.
• President Hadi must not ignore deeper issues, such as enforcing non-partisan rules regarding the management of personnel, integrating tribesmen into security forces and ensuring civilian oversight. Changes on this scale require an inclusive political consensus, without which major stakeholders are unlikely to relinquish their independent powers.
• Such a political consensus should result from the national dialogue that began on 18 March. However, this process must genuinely include two major constituencies that have been essentially excluded in the past: the Huthis – a primarily northern movement unhappy with the central government – and southern separatists. These groups are unlikely to support restructuring of the security forces without broad agreement on the parameters of the future Yemeni state.

“President Hadi must avoid ruling simply by decree, or making security appointments that smack of his own brand of partisanship”, says April Longley Alley, Crisis Group’s Senior Yemen Analyst. “To that end, he should communicate to stakeholders and the public the rationale behind new appointments”.

“The national dialogue’s goal is to generate a virtuous cycle in which security restructuring and the national dialogue reinforce one another”, says Robert Malley, Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program Director. “That’s a tall order, and international actors can and should lend a hand. But Yemenis themselves will have to get the sequence and timing right”.

FULL REPORT

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CrisisWatch N°115  |  (01 Mar 2013)

The assassination on 6 February of opposition leader Chokri Belaïd sparked Tunisia’s worst political crisis since the 2011 revolution. The killing triggered mass protests throughout the country against the ruling Islamist party An-Nahda, and in turn counter-protests by An-Nahda supporters. Having dissolved the government in response to the assassination, Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali later resigned after his plan to form an interim cabinet of technocrats collapsed in the face of opposition from his own An-Nahda party.

Syria’s conflict continued to exact a horrific toll, with the number of dead, wounded and displaced rising. The Assad regime further escalated violence, reportedly firing ballistic missiles into civilian neighbourhoods, while reports also emerged of its mistreatment of prisoners; the rebels continued to make steady gains; signs of intensifying communal and sectarian friction continued to emerge. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees called the humanitarian situation “dramatic beyond description”. As yet there is little sign of progress in advancing a political solution to the crisis.

The Syrian conflict continues to threaten to destabilise neighbouring Lebanon. Ever more refugees flow across the border and Hizbollah appears increasingly sucked into the fighting. Meanwhile recent controversy over a proposed new electoral law exposed rising sectarianism and mistrust between the various Lebanese communities.

In Yemen, tensions between southern separatists on the one hand and state security forces and the Islamist party, Islah, on the other reached their highest levels since early 2012, and could lead to further violence. Clashes between separatist protesters and security forces in the South left at least six people dead. The UN Security Council warned that the actions of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and separatist leader Ali Salim al-Bid threatened to undermine the country’s democratic transition.

North Korea conducted its third nuclear test on 12 February, a reaction to the UN Security Council’s January resolution condemning its satellite launch last December. As the Security Council held immediate emergency talks, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the nuclear test as “deeply destabilising”. China also declared publicly its “firm opposition” to the test and summoned the North Korean ambassador to Beijing to express its dissatisfaction.

Tension increased ahead of Guinea’s forthcoming legislative elections. The electoral commission, accelerating its preparations for the vote scheduled for 12 May, controversially validated the choice of two companies to undertake a revision of voter rolls. The opposition, who believe the companies are open to political pressure, responded by withdrawing from electoral preparations, and opposition supporters protested in Conakry and other cities.

In Bangladesh, violent Islamist protests against the country’s 1971 war crimes tribunal intensified, as protesters faced off against a popular movement in support of death sentences for those accused, including senior leaders of the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami. One of the organisers of the demonstrations in support of death sentences was hacked to death in a suspected Jamaat-e-Islami attack mid-February. Dozens have been killed in clashes since the tribunal sentenced a Jamaat-e-Islami leader to death on 28 February, and violence was continuing. The government faces growing calls to ban Jamaat-e-Islami.

In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe announced that the referendum on a new constitution would be held on 16 March, as worrying reports emerged of politically-motivated violence and intimidation, and of raids on non-governmental organisations (NGOs), confiscation of their documents and equipment, and police allegations that 99 per cent of NGOs are engaged in regime change.

FULL CRISISWATCH

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Yemen: A rare ‘success’ ‘at risk | BBC

By Barbara Plett

As turmoil seeped across Arab borders in 2011, the UN Security Council threw its weight behind a political transition plan for a nation roiled by protests and violence, stopping the drift towards civil war and leading to the resignation of the authoritarian leader.

No, this is not a fantasy about what might have been for Syria. It is the reality of what happened in Yemen.

And it is the reason council members see Yemen as a rare success story in their track record on the Arab uprisings, last week making it the destination of their first visit to the Middle East in five years.

FULL ARTICLE (BBC)

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Jemen ein Jahr danach: Der Regimewechsel steht noch aus | der Standard

von Gudrun Harrer

Ali Mohsen steht der islamistischen Partei Islah nahe - und Präsident Hadi hat in letzter Zeit viele Islah-Leute in wichtige Posten gehievt, zu viele für den Geschmack der revolutionären Jugend, aber sogar für den von manchen anderen Mitgliedern des oppositionellen Parteienbündnisses JMP. Die Islah ist ohne Zweifel heute die stärkste Partei des Jemen - auch hier fährt der Zug in Richtung mehr staatlicher Islam -, aber noch hat sie keine Wahlen gewonnen. Dass sie dennoch jetzt schon abkassiert, stört viele.

Manchmal scheint Hadi überhaupt zu vergessen, dass er nur einer Not-Transitionsregierung vorsteht, schreibt der Thinktank International Crisis Group (ICG) in einem Bericht im Oktober. Auch Hadi platziert vermehrt Leute aus seinem Clan - auch er hat einen Sohn - rund um sich. Angesichts der schlechten Sicherheitssituation ist verständlich, dass er enge Vertraute für seinen Schutz einsetzt, aber in der Politik haben sie eigentlich nichts zu suchen. Spöttisch spricht man jetzt schon von einer “Abyanisierung”, die Salehs “Sanhanisierung” abgelöst habe. Hadi stammt aus Abyan, so wie Saleh aus Sanhan stammte.

GANZEN ARTIKEL (der Standard)

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Southern support essential for Yemen dialogue | AFP

By Taieb Mahjoub

DUBAI — The lifting of a boycott by southern separatist factions of Yemen’s national dialogue, a key component of a UN-brokered power transition deal signed a year ago, is seen as vital for the success of the talks.

The agreement that eased president Ali Abdullah Saleh out of office after three decades in power and following a year of protests calls for the national dialogue to produce a new constitution and electoral law.

But the “Southern Movement participation in the national dialogue is a ‘make or break’ issue,” said April Longley Alley, a senior analyst from the International Crisis Group.

FULL ARTICLE (AFP)

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Yemen: New challenges for aid worker security | IRIN

DUBAI, 14 November 2012 (IRIN) - Yemen has long been renowned as a place where foreigners, including aid workers, are at risk of kidnapping. On the brink of civil war last year, and with a still fluid social and political transition under way, new challenges for aid worker security are emerging, say experts. 

“It’s more risky than before, not just for foreigners, but they are the number one target,” said Nasser Arrabyee, a local analyst and journalist. 

“Since the election in February, the security situation has deteriorated gradually,” Siris Hartkorn, head of risk analysis at Safer Yemen, a security consultancy specializing in advice to humanitarian organizations, told IRIN. “It is more insecure than it has ever been before.” 

FULL ARTICLE (IRIN)

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Triage for a fracturing Yemen | Foreign Policy 

By April Longley Alley 

Nearly a year after former President Ali Abdullah Saleh signed a transition agreement, Yemen risks significant localized violence and territorial fragmentation. While politicians and the international community in the capital prepare for national dialogue, Zaydi rebels, known as the Houthis, and Salafi fighters associated with the Islamist party, Islah, are positioning for further skirmishes in the North. Already, clashes during the last months have killed dozens of people and inflammatory rhetoric by both sides is a harbinger of violence to come. In the South, separatist sentiment remains high and there is no agreement on how to effectively include the southern movement, a loose and divided coalition calling for immediate southern independence or at a minimum greater autonomy, into the dialogue process. Attacks by al Qaeda and its local affiliate, Ansar al-Sharia, are on the rise, with assassinations of over 60 military-security personnel in 2012 alone. The minister of defense has escaped assassination on at least six different occasions.

FULL ARTICLE (Foreign Policy)

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Building a Yemeni state while losing a nation | Foreign Policy

By Silvana Toska

During his recent visit to the United States, President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi of Yemen expressed his concerns that if the National Dialogue — a forum supposedly representing the major political players in Yemen — fails, Yemen could slide into a civil war that will be worse than those in Somalia or Afghanistan. Part of this rhetoric was strategic, intended to nudge the so-called “Friends of Yemen” to commit to much needed (although potentially pernicious) aid. Nevertheless, Hadi is only slightly exaggerating the dangers Yemen could face, and recent developments — such as the delay of the National Dialogue — make his predictions more worrisome.

Hadi, who ran unopposed in February, was elected after a prolonged stalemate since January 2011. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-engineered compromise that ensured the transfer of power from then President Ali Abdullah Saleh to Hadi helped avert the civil war that Yemen was dangerously skirting at that time. Many groups in Yemen, however, view the GCC deal as a failure and an imposition that ensured that formal and informal power remain in the hands of old elites. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) reports, Yemeni elites have kept their hold on power as they continue to play musical chairs with government positions. Meanwhile, the Houthi rebels in the North, the Hiraaki separatists in the South, as well as various youth groups who were the backbone of the early days of the revolution, are left out of the deal.

FULL ARTICLE (Foreign Policy)

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Analysis: Where will Yemen’s aid money go? | IRIN

“This is going to be an enormous challenge,” April Alley, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, told IRIN. “The government is deeply divided. What little bureaucratic capacity they have has been hampered further by the fact that some ministries are in shambles – literally in shambles from the previous fighting with many buildings destroyed, computers stolen and offices looted. Also civil servants are being changed and rotated, often for political reasons. The absorptive capacity problems that existed under Saleh are likely to be augmented in the current political environment.”

FULL ARTICLE (IRIN)

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Middle East Live Update | Guardian

11.32am: Yemen:

The internatonally-backed “transition” plan which resulted in the removal of President Saleh last February has often been touted as a model for the way forward in Syria. However, the latest report from the International Crisis Group highlights a lot of shortcomings.

The nation essentially has witnessed a political game of musical chairs, one elite faction swapping places with the other but remaining at loggerheads …

The settlement failed to resolve the highly personalised conflict between Saleh and his family on the one hand, and General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, as well as the powerful al-Ahmar family, on the other …

Likewise, the underlying political economy of corruption has remained virtually untouched. The same families retain control of most of the country’s resources while relying on patronage networks and dominating decision-making in the government, military and political parties.

For frustrated independent activists, the struggle at the top amounts to little more than a political see-saw between two camps that have dominated the country for some 33 years …

The army is still divided, with warring commanders escaping the president’s full authority. Armed factions and tribal groups loyal to Saleh, Ali Mohsen or the al-Ahmars remain in the capital; elsewhere the situation is far worse

MORE LIVE UPDATES (Guardian)

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