Showing posts tagged as "obama"

Showing posts tagged obama

30 Apr

The Broader International Question: What To Do About Syria? | NPR Morning Edition

The Obama administration acknowledged last week that there’s evidence the Syrian government had used chemical weapons. President Obama warned Syria not to cross that “red line,” and now some Washington lawmakers are urging the president to take forceful action — including military intervention. Renee Montagne talks with Robert Malley, Middle East and North Africa program director at the International Crisis Group, about Obama’s options in Syria.

NPR Morning Edition

Photo: Maggie Osama/Flickr

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20 Nov
"The message is clear: Hey North Korea, see Burma emerging from international isolation to growing foreign investment, declining foreign military threats and perhaps even improving political stability? This could be you, if you would only, for example, “demonstrate a seriousness of purpose” on winding down the nuclear weapons program, as National Security Adviser Tom Donilon put it in a speech last week."

Obama’s message for North Korea in visiting Burma: Let’s make up | The Washington Post
By Max Fisher

19 Nov
Myanmar Facing Unfolding Crisis | CNN GPS 
Louise Arbour, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group
When U.S. President Barack Obama visits Myanmar in the next few days, he will encounter a country undergoing one of the most dramatic – and positive – transitions in recent memory, but one which also now faces an unfolding crisis of deeply disturbing proportions. The flare-up of mass violence in the western region of Rakhine State, in part a by-product of the country’s ongoing transformation, represents a backward step that hands the Southeast Asian nation’s government and its opposition leaders their toughest challenge yet.
Since March 2011, Myanmar has been enjoying a remarkable political transition. The country’s leaders have demonstrated the political will and the vision to move the country decisively away from the past.
President Thein Sein has declared the changes irreversible and worked to build a durable partnership with the opposition, in particular Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. While the process remains incomplete, much has been achieved: many political prisoners have been released, blacklists trimmed, freedom of assembly laws implemented, and media censorship abolished, not to mention last year’s by-elections, which saw Suu Kyi and her party enter parliament.
Even the country’s multiple internal ethnic conflicts seemed to be on a generally positive path. With ten major ceasefires signed, only a deal with the Kachin armed group remains elusive. While addressing the grievances underpinning these conflicts on the periphery remains the core goal, clearly securing ceasefires is a vital first step.
Then, in June, ethnic violence in Rakhine State disrupted this encouraging narrative. The alleged rape and murder of a Buddhist woman by Muslim men was the trigger that led long simmering tensions between Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya to explode. Dozens were killed, hundreds of houses were burned, and 75,000 mostly Rohingya were displaced by subsequent intercommunal violence in northern Rakhine State.
Widespread violence erupted again on October 21 in new areas of Rakhine State, bringing the number killed to about 140 and the total displaced to some 110,000. This latest round of violence consisted of attacks against not just Rohingya but also non-Rohingya Muslim communities, with indications that they were organized in advance by extremist elements.
Thus far, the government has been unable to fully contain the situation. Local authorities and security forces have in some cases acted in a partisan manner. Neither the authorities nor the national opposition have adequately challenged the extremist rhetoric fuelling the ethnic violence. It should be noted that the Rohingya for too long have been the pariah people of the region, enduring fierce discrimination in Myanmar and neighboring Bangladesh, and scant support elsewhere, though the recent violence has triggered soundings of displeasure from a number of Asia’s Muslim-majority countries.
In part, tensions such as these are to be expected in a country emerging from authoritarian rule. Social friction can increase as more freedom allows long unaddressed issues to resurface. In Myanmar one can also see grassroots protests over land grabs and abuses by local authorities, as well as environmental and social concerns over foreign-backed infrastructure and mining projects.
Still, the mounting problem in Rakhine State is the primary concern. It is an extremely dangerous situation for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country like Myanmar. Indeed, any further rupturing of intercommunal relations could threaten national stability.
Experience shows communal tensions can be exploited and inflamed for political gain. In particular, there is a real risk that the violence in Rakhine State will take on a more explicitly Buddhist-Muslim character, with the possibility of clashes spreading to the many other areas where there are minority Muslim populations.
The emergence of a “Buddhist solidarity” lobby around the Rakhine issue – with Buddhist monks and a segment of the Burman elite demonstrating in support of Rakhine Buddhists – does not augur well.
President Thein Sein has established an investigation commission with a broad mandate to examine the causes of the violence and the official response, and provide suggestions on how to resolve the situation and for reconciliation and the socioeconomic development of the area. Its work could be very important to define a way forward for Rakhine State and catalyze national reflection on the issue of identity and diversity in this multi-religious country.
If, however, the commission’s final report, expected in the coming months, is a diluted text that avoids controversial issues, or if it ends up reflecting a majority view that is seen as partisan and not conducive to reconciliation, the exercise will have done little to further the cause of peace.
The violence in Rakhine State represents a major test for the government as it seeks to maintain law and order without rekindling memories of the recent authoritarian past. It also represents a challenge for Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy to demonstrate a greater commitment, publicly and privately, to the fundamental rights of all those who live in Myanmar.
Above all, both government and opposition need to show moral leadership to calm the tensions and work for durable solutions to a problem that could threaten Myanmar’s reform process and the stability of the country.
Louise Arbour is President of the International Crisis Group.
(CNN GPS)
Photo: thaigov/Wikimedia Commons

Myanmar Facing Unfolding Crisis | CNN GPS 

Louise Arbour, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group

When U.S. President Barack Obama visits Myanmar in the next few days, he will encounter a country undergoing one of the most dramatic – and positive – transitions in recent memory, but one which also now faces an unfolding crisis of deeply disturbing proportions. The flare-up of mass violence in the western region of Rakhine State, in part a by-product of the country’s ongoing transformation, represents a backward step that hands the Southeast Asian nation’s government and its opposition leaders their toughest challenge yet.

Since March 2011, Myanmar has been enjoying a remarkable political transition. The country’s leaders have demonstrated the political will and the vision to move the country decisively away from the past.

President Thein Sein has declared the changes irreversible and worked to build a durable partnership with the opposition, in particular Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. While the process remains incomplete, much has been achieved: many political prisoners have been released, blacklists trimmed, freedom of assembly laws implemented, and media censorship abolished, not to mention last year’s by-elections, which saw Suu Kyi and her party enter parliament.

Even the country’s multiple internal ethnic conflicts seemed to be on a generally positive path. With ten major ceasefires signed, only a deal with the Kachin armed group remains elusive. While addressing the grievances underpinning these conflicts on the periphery remains the core goal, clearly securing ceasefires is a vital first step.

Then, in June, ethnic violence in Rakhine State disrupted this encouraging narrative. The alleged rape and murder of a Buddhist woman by Muslim men was the trigger that led long simmering tensions between Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya to explode. Dozens were killed, hundreds of houses were burned, and 75,000 mostly Rohingya were displaced by subsequent intercommunal violence in northern Rakhine State.

Widespread violence erupted again on October 21 in new areas of Rakhine State, bringing the number killed to about 140 and the total displaced to some 110,000. This latest round of violence consisted of attacks against not just Rohingya but also non-Rohingya Muslim communities, with indications that they were organized in advance by extremist elements.

Thus far, the government has been unable to fully contain the situation. Local authorities and security forces have in some cases acted in a partisan manner. Neither the authorities nor the national opposition have adequately challenged the extremist rhetoric fuelling the ethnic violence. It should be noted that the Rohingya for too long have been the pariah people of the region, enduring fierce discrimination in Myanmar and neighboring Bangladesh, and scant support elsewhere, though the recent violence has triggered soundings of displeasure from a number of Asia’s Muslim-majority countries.

In part, tensions such as these are to be expected in a country emerging from authoritarian rule. Social friction can increase as more freedom allows long unaddressed issues to resurface. In Myanmar one can also see grassroots protests over land grabs and abuses by local authorities, as well as environmental and social concerns over foreign-backed infrastructure and mining projects.

Still, the mounting problem in Rakhine State is the primary concern. It is an extremely dangerous situation for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country like Myanmar. Indeed, any further rupturing of intercommunal relations could threaten national stability.

Experience shows communal tensions can be exploited and inflamed for political gain. In particular, there is a real risk that the violence in Rakhine State will take on a more explicitly Buddhist-Muslim character, with the possibility of clashes spreading to the many other areas where there are minority Muslim populations.

The emergence of a “Buddhist solidarity” lobby around the Rakhine issue – with Buddhist monks and a segment of the Burman elite demonstrating in support of Rakhine Buddhists – does not augur well.

President Thein Sein has established an investigation commission with a broad mandate to examine the causes of the violence and the official response, and provide suggestions on how to resolve the situation and for reconciliation and the socioeconomic development of the area. Its work could be very important to define a way forward for Rakhine State and catalyze national reflection on the issue of identity and diversity in this multi-religious country.

If, however, the commission’s final report, expected in the coming months, is a diluted text that avoids controversial issues, or if it ends up reflecting a majority view that is seen as partisan and not conducive to reconciliation, the exercise will have done little to further the cause of peace.

The violence in Rakhine State represents a major test for the government as it seeks to maintain law and order without rekindling memories of the recent authoritarian past. It also represents a challenge for Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy to demonstrate a greater commitment, publicly and privately, to the fundamental rights of all those who live in Myanmar.

Above all, both government and opposition need to show moral leadership to calm the tensions and work for durable solutions to a problem that could threaten Myanmar’s reform process and the stability of the country.

Louise Arbour is President of the International Crisis Group.

(CNN GPS)

Photo: thaigov/Wikimedia Commons

In light of President Obama’s visit to Myanmar, check out Crisis Group’s most recent report, Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon.
Photo: Pete Souza/Wikimedia Commons

In light of President Obama’s visit to Myanmar, check out Crisis Group’s most recent report, Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon.

Photo: Pete Souza/Wikimedia Commons

10 Nov
Obama to visit Myanmar, an overture to a one-time pariah | Christian Science Monitor
By Dan Murphy
Rarely has a country been brought back into the American fold as fast as Myanmar (also known as Burma) has. 
Starting in late 2010, the military junta that has run the country since 1962 stunningly reversed course.
Not only did it release Aun San Suu Kyi, whose political party won the 1990 elections that the military promptly ignored, from almost two decades of imprisonment and house arrest, but allowed her unprecedented freedom of movement and political organization.
FULL ARTICLE (Christian Science Monitor)
Photo: HeyRocker/Flickr

Obama to visit Myanmar, an overture to a one-time pariah | Christian Science Monitor

By Dan Murphy

Rarely has a country been brought back into the American fold as fast as Myanmar (also known as Burma) has. 

Starting in late 2010, the military junta that has run the country since 1962 stunningly reversed course.

Not only did it release Aun San Suu Kyi, whose political party won the 1990 elections that the military promptly ignored, from almost two decades of imprisonment and house arrest, but allowed her unprecedented freedom of movement and political organization.

FULL ARTICLE (Christian Science Monitor)

Photo: HeyRocker/Flickr

7 Nov
"You could see things going to the point that the [Palestinian Authority] becomes an organization in name only…The whole Palestinian identity question will come back to the fore."

Robert Malley, Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program Director, on the foreign policy challenges President Obama will face in his second term.

FULL ARTICLE (The Wall Street Journal)

27 Jun
North Korea Tests the Patience of Close Ally China | Jakarta Globe
By Jane Perlez
As Kim Jong Un, the young leader of North Korea, consolidates his grip on power, China is showing signs of increasing frustration at the bellicose behavior of its longtime ally.
Since succeeding his father, Kim Jong Il, six months ago, Kim Jong Un has quickly alienated the Obama administration and put North Korea on track to develop a nuclear warhead that could hit the United States within a few years, Chinese and Western analysts say.
Most surprising, though, is how Kim has thumbed his nose at China, whose economic largess keeps the government afloat. For example, shortly after Kim took over, a Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs, Fu Ying, visited Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital, and sternly warned him not to proceed with a ballistic missile test. The new leader went ahead anyway.
Now, the Obama administration and the Chinese government, who warily consult each other on North Korea, are waiting to see if Kim will follow in his father’s footsteps and carry out a nuclear test, which would be North Korea’s third. The previous tests were in 2006 and 2009.
FULL ARTICLE (Jakarta Globe)
Photo: Ng Han Guan

North Korea Tests the Patience of Close Ally China | Jakarta Globe

By Jane Perlez

As Kim Jong Un, the young leader of North Korea, consolidates his grip on power, China is showing signs of increasing frustration at the bellicose behavior of its longtime ally.

Since succeeding his father, Kim Jong Il, six months ago, Kim Jong Un has quickly alienated the Obama administration and put North Korea on track to develop a nuclear warhead that could hit the United States within a few years, Chinese and Western analysts say.

Most surprising, though, is how Kim has thumbed his nose at China, whose economic largess keeps the government afloat. For example, shortly after Kim took over, a Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs, Fu Ying, visited Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital, and sternly warned him not to proceed with a ballistic missile test. The new leader went ahead anyway.

Now, the Obama administration and the Chinese government, who warily consult each other on North Korea, are waiting to see if Kim will follow in his father’s footsteps and carry out a nuclear test, which would be North Korea’s third. The previous tests were in 2006 and 2009.

FULL ARTICLE (Jakarta Globe)

Photo: Ng Han Guan

22 Jun
Comment | Iran’s Nuclear Calculus | PBS Frontline
By Ali Vaez
Tehran’s nuclear calculus has fluctuated significantly since negotiations between Iran and the world powers resumed in April. Iran first appeared eager for a deal that could check the damaging momentum of sanctions and avert a war. The run-up to the Istanbul meeting was marked by positive signs, ranging from Ayatollah Khamenei’s rare praise of President Obama’s defense of diplomacy and the reiteration of his nuclear fatwa, to Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s constructive commentary in the Washington Post indicating commitment to diplomacy, and the conciliatory remarks by Fereydoun Abbasi Davani, chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, on halting high-level enrichment. At the same time, Iran’s confidence was bolstered by its recent advances in nuclear technology and the completion of the underground uranium enrichment facility at Fordow.
In the wake of the Istanbul meeting, and despite its concentration on generalities, the mood in Tehran became Pollyannaish. The West’s renewed interest in diplomacy, based on a step-by-step reciprocal process, was interpreted as a sign of weakness — a desperate attempt to tame oil prices and avert a military confrontation ahead of the U.S. presidential election and amid an unprecedented economic crisis in Europe. Tehran consequently orchestrated a messaging campaign to up the ante in Baghdad by simultaneously demanding the removal of sanctions and conditioning the public for a compromise.
Seemingly based on this calculation, in the second meeting with members of the P5+1, Iran presented a five-point strategy that included both nuclear and nonnuclear matters. But the Western response poured cold water on the expectations of Iranian negotiators. In mirror image, the West had equated Iran’s willingness to resume talks with its eagerness to delay further sanctions and avert an Israeli military attack. Perceiving signs of Iranian weakness, the West had no intention to relax or postpone sanctions on Iran’s oil sector and central bank short of a major concession by Tehran. The Iranians realized that they had erred in insisting on easing the sanctions and reverted to more familiar hardline posturing, evidenced by their foot-dragging on efforts to resolve outstanding problems with the International Atomic Energy Agency and an acerbic squabble with European negotiators vis-à-vis preparatory talks.
In Moscow, Iranian negotiators stood firm, counting on their Russian allies to persuade the rest of the P5+1 to show more flexibility. Nevertheless, intent on not being seen as stalling, Iran prepared a comprehensive response to further underscore its position and respond to the P5+1’s demands. Their proactive media campaign in Moscow, especially Deputy Negotiator Ali Bagheri’s press briefing, was testament to this strategy.
Iran and the P5+1’s diplomatic roller coaster hit bottom in Moscow, yielding nothing more than a follow-on technical meeting. But the prospect of achieving a breakthrough was as illusory as a breakdown could have been perilous. Rather than more brinkmanship based on mismatched expectations and misguided convictions, both sides should embrace intensive, continuous, technical-level negotiations to achieve a limited agreement on Iran’s 20 percent enrichment.
FULL COMMENT (PBS)
Photo: Mohammad Hassanzadeh/ FARS News Agency

Comment | Iran’s Nuclear Calculus | PBS Frontline

By Ali Vaez

Tehran’s nuclear calculus has fluctuated significantly since negotiations between Iran and the world powers resumed in April. Iran first appeared eager for a deal that could check the damaging momentum of sanctions and avert a war. The run-up to the Istanbul meeting was marked by positive signs, ranging from Ayatollah Khamenei’s rare praise of President Obama’s defense of diplomacy and the reiteration of his nuclear fatwa, to Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s constructive commentary in the Washington Post indicating commitment to diplomacy, and the conciliatory remarks by Fereydoun Abbasi Davani, chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, on halting high-level enrichment. At the same time, Iran’s confidence was bolstered by its recent advances in nuclear technology and the completion of the underground uranium enrichment facility at Fordow.

In the wake of the Istanbul meeting, and despite its concentration on generalities, the mood in Tehran became Pollyannaish. The West’s renewed interest in diplomacy, based on a step-by-step reciprocal process, was interpreted as a sign of weakness — a desperate attempt to tame oil prices and avert a military confrontation ahead of the U.S. presidential election and amid an unprecedented economic crisis in Europe. Tehran consequently orchestrated a messaging campaign to up the ante in Baghdad by simultaneously demanding the removal of sanctions and conditioning the public for a compromise.

Seemingly based on this calculation, in the second meeting with members of the P5+1, Iran presented a five-point strategy that included both nuclear and nonnuclear matters. But the Western response poured cold water on the expectations of Iranian negotiators. In mirror image, the West had equated Iran’s willingness to resume talks with its eagerness to delay further sanctions and avert an Israeli military attack. Perceiving signs of Iranian weakness, the West had no intention to relax or postpone sanctions on Iran’s oil sector and central bank short of a major concession by Tehran. The Iranians realized that they had erred in insisting on easing the sanctions and reverted to more familiar hardline posturing, evidenced by their foot-dragging on efforts to resolve outstanding problems with the International Atomic Energy Agency and an acerbic squabble with European negotiators vis-à-vis preparatory talks.

In Moscow, Iranian negotiators stood firm, counting on their Russian allies to persuade the rest of the P5+1 to show more flexibility. Nevertheless, intent on not being seen as stalling, Iran prepared a comprehensive response to further underscore its position and respond to the P5+1’s demands. Their proactive media campaign in Moscow, especially Deputy Negotiator Ali Bagheri’s press briefing, was testament to this strategy.

Iran and the P5+1’s diplomatic roller coaster hit bottom in Moscow, yielding nothing more than a follow-on technical meeting. But the prospect of achieving a breakthrough was as illusory as a breakdown could have been perilous. Rather than more brinkmanship based on mismatched expectations and misguided convictions, both sides should embrace intensive, continuous, technical-level negotiations to achieve a limited agreement on Iran’s 20 percent enrichment.

FULL COMMENT (PBS)

Photo: Mohammad Hassanzadeh/ FARS News Agency

14 Jun
Vladimir Putin steps out | The Economist
MOSCOW - NEXT week Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama will meet again. In July 2009, the only time the two have met before, Mr Putin—then Russia’s prime minister, now its president—gave the American president an earful on the insults Russia had suffered from America. Mr Putin thinks that the conciliatory steps he took in his first term, especially after September 11th 2001, encountered American aggression: the “orange” revolution in Ukraine, Western support for Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili, a missile-defence system. As Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, says, Mr Putin is “sincerely anti-American,” not because of his KGB past, but because of “his experiences with Bush-era America”.
The “reset” by the Obama administration in early 2009 was meant to respond to this by letting bygones be bygones. Mr Obama and his advisers, who included the present American ambassador to Moscow, Michael McFaul, hoped that the reset would return the focus of relations to the countries’ shared interests. It coincided with some achievements: a new treaty reducing nuclear arsenals, greater co-operation on sanctions against Iran, an agreement to allow supplies for the war in Afghanistan to pass through Russia and Central Asia. The then Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, has even described the past three years as “the best period in US-Russia relations in history”.
READ ARTICLE (The Economist)
Photo: Getty Images

Vladimir Putin steps out | The Economist

MOSCOW - NEXT week Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama will meet again. In July 2009, the only time the two have met before, Mr Putin—then Russia’s prime minister, now its president—gave the American president an earful on the insults Russia had suffered from America. Mr Putin thinks that the conciliatory steps he took in his first term, especially after September 11th 2001, encountered American aggression: the “orange” revolution in Ukraine, Western support for Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili, a missile-defence system. As Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, says, Mr Putin is “sincerely anti-American,” not because of his KGB past, but because of “his experiences with Bush-era America”.

The “reset” by the Obama administration in early 2009 was meant to respond to this by letting bygones be bygones. Mr Obama and his advisers, who included the present American ambassador to Moscow, Michael McFaul, hoped that the reset would return the focus of relations to the countries’ shared interests. It coincided with some achievements: a new treaty reducing nuclear arsenals, greater co-operation on sanctions against Iran, an agreement to allow supplies for the war in Afghanistan to pass through Russia and Central Asia. The then Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, has even described the past three years as “the best period in US-Russia relations in history”.

READ ARTICLE (The Economist)

Photo: Getty Images

21 May
Reuters | Maliki, in charm offensive, invites scholars to Baghdad
By Alister Bull
Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, concerned by his portrayal in U.S. media as an autocratic leader intent on consolidating power, has invited several influential Washington scholars to Baghdad to meet his team next week.
The rare invitation was extended to Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution, Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institution and Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group, Reuters has learned.
“I think it a very smart and constructive step on his part,” said Pollack, a former CIA military analyst who served in President Bill Clinton’s White House and also authored an influential book backing the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.
Maliki’s opponents have accused the Shi’ite leader of amassing power they fear will restore the dictatorship toppled by the United States when it felled Saddam Hussein.
Iraqi officials said the idea behind inviting the scholars was to put out Baghdad’s side of the story and respond to a “deliberate distortion of reality” being promoted by Maliki’s opponents.
“He feels that there is an increasing hostile activity against Iraq and the Iraqi government that attempts to give an unfavorable and negative picture about the situation in Iraq,” said Ali Al-Mussawi, chief media adviser to the prime minister, responding to an enquiry made to Iraq’s embassy in Washington.
President Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of last year is blamed by critics for a political crisis that erupted as soon as they left and has raised fears the country could tip back into civil war.
FULL ARTICLE (Reuters)

Reuters | Maliki, in charm offensive, invites scholars to Baghdad

By Alister Bull

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, concerned by his portrayal in U.S. media as an autocratic leader intent on consolidating power, has invited several influential Washington scholars to Baghdad to meet his team next week.

The rare invitation was extended to Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution, Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institution and Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group, Reuters has learned.

“I think it a very smart and constructive step on his part,” said Pollack, a former CIA military analyst who served in President Bill Clinton’s White House and also authored an influential book backing the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

Maliki’s opponents have accused the Shi’ite leader of amassing power they fear will restore the dictatorship toppled by the United States when it felled Saddam Hussein.

Iraqi officials said the idea behind inviting the scholars was to put out Baghdad’s side of the story and respond to a “deliberate distortion of reality” being promoted by Maliki’s opponents.

“He feels that there is an increasing hostile activity against Iraq and the Iraqi government that attempts to give an unfavorable and negative picture about the situation in Iraq,” said Ali Al-Mussawi, chief media adviser to the prime minister, responding to an enquiry made to Iraq’s embassy in Washington.

President Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of last year is blamed by critics for a political crisis that erupted as soon as they left and has raised fears the country could tip back into civil war.

FULL ARTICLE (Reuters)