Showing posts tagged as "lebanon"

Showing posts tagged lebanon

13 May
"A population influx of such magnitude would be a huge problem anywhere. In Lebanon – with fragile institutions and infrastructure; a delicate political and sectarian balance; tense social fabric; and declining economy, all of which the refugee crisis worsens – it is a nightmare."

—from Crisis Group’s most recent report, Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon 

"What began as relatively modest help to the regime over time has mushroomed into what now appears to be direct, comprehensive, full-fledged and less and less concealed military support."

—from Crisis Group’s most recent report, Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon

"The vast majority are Sunnis who back the uprising. Most Lebanese view the conflict through a sectarian prism, and thus their attitude toward refugees from the outset has largely been informed by confessional considerations, as well as by their potential security impact and implications for future domestic politics."

—from Crisis Group’s most recent report, Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon

"Porous boundaries, weapons smuggling, deepening involvement by anti-Syrian-regime Sunni Islamists on one side and the pro-regime Hizbollah on the other, and cross-border skirmishes, all atop a massive refugee inflow, implicate Lebanon ever more deeply in the conflict next door."

—from Crisis Group’s most recent report, Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon

Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon
Beirut/Washington   |   13 May 2013
As the Syrian conflict increasingly implicates and spills over into Lebanon, a priority for its government and international partners must be to tackle the refugee crisis, lest it ignite domestic conflict that a weak state and volatile region can ill afford.
In its latest report, Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon, the International Crisis Group examines the impact of Syria’s war on its most fragile neighbour.  It focuses on the presence of over a million Syrians, half of them refugees – a figure that is a quarter as great as the state’s citizen population of four million. The influx of refugees aggravates state dysfunction, taxes Lebanon’s already limited resources and, by reigniting fears of a shift in the sensitive confessional make-up, risks renewing violent conflict in a state still recovering from its devastating civil war of the 1970s and 1980s. 
The report’s major findings and recommendations are:
Porous boundaries, weapons smuggling, deepening involvement by Sunni Islamists opposed to the Syrian regime on one side and, especially, the pro-regime Hizbollah on the other, and cross-border skirmishes are drawing Lebanon ever more deeply into its neighbour’s conflict which, in turn, increasingly morphs into a regional and international confrontation between opposing axes.
Lebanon is reaching a breaking point: the refugee influx rises daily and likely will soar if and when the battle for Damascus is fully joined; this Syrian presence is fueling pre-existing political, social and communal tensions and exposing Lebanon’s dysfunctions and declining economy; the government, divided and polarised, has been slow to meet the resulting challenges.
Once Lebanon’s factions negotiate a replacement for the government that fell in March, the new cabinet needs to tackle the refugee question head-on. Together with the political parties, it should plan the establishment of refugee camps, while exploring with security and military authorities how to ensure their safety without excessively intrusive measures.
The international donor community should give Lebanon, UN agencies and their partners the funds they need to address the refugee crisis.
“Lebanon’s fate historically has been deeply intertwined with Syria’s”, says Sahar Atrache, Middle East and North Africa Analyst.  “As Syria heads even more steadily toward catastrophe, there is every reason for Lebanese of all persuasions to worry about their own country — and to do something about it”. 
“It is too late for Lebanon to wind back the clock and adopt a genuine policy of non-interference.  But if the country’s various political forces cannot agree on what to do in Syria, at least they might agree on a sensible approach toward the refugee tragedy”, says Program Director Robert Malley.  “Such a population influx would be staggering anywhere, but with Lebanon’s institutional frailty, scant resources and highly sensitive sectarian balance, it is a nightmare”.
FULL REPORT

Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon

Beirut/Washington   |   13 May 2013

As the Syrian conflict increasingly implicates and spills over into Lebanon, a priority for its government and international partners must be to tackle the refugee crisis, lest it ignite domestic conflict that a weak state and volatile region can ill afford.

In its latest report, Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon, the International Crisis Group examines the impact of Syria’s war on its most fragile neighbour.  It focuses on the presence of over a million Syrians, half of them refugees – a figure that is a quarter as great as the state’s citizen population of four million. The influx of refugees aggravates state dysfunction, taxes Lebanon’s already limited resources and, by reigniting fears of a shift in the sensitive confessional make-up, risks renewing violent conflict in a state still recovering from its devastating civil war of the 1970s and 1980s. 

The report’s major findings and recommendations are:

  • Porous boundaries, weapons smuggling, deepening involvement by Sunni Islamists opposed to the Syrian regime on one side and, especially, the pro-regime Hizbollah on the other, and cross-border skirmishes are drawing Lebanon ever more deeply into its neighbour’s conflict which, in turn, increasingly morphs into a regional and international confrontation between opposing axes.
  • Lebanon is reaching a breaking point: the refugee influx rises daily and likely will soar if and when the battle for Damascus is fully joined; this Syrian presence is fueling pre-existing political, social and communal tensions and exposing Lebanon’s dysfunctions and declining economy; the government, divided and polarised, has been slow to meet the resulting challenges.
  • Once Lebanon’s factions negotiate a replacement for the government that fell in March, the new cabinet needs to tackle the refugee question head-on. Together with the political parties, it should plan the establishment of refugee camps, while exploring with security and military authorities how to ensure their safety without excessively intrusive measures.
  • The international donor community should give Lebanon, UN agencies and their partners the funds they need to address the refugee crisis.

“Lebanon’s fate historically has been deeply intertwined with Syria’s”, says Sahar Atrache, Middle East and North Africa Analyst.  “As Syria heads even more steadily toward catastrophe, there is every reason for Lebanese of all persuasions to worry about their own country — and to do something about it”. 

“It is too late for Lebanon to wind back the clock and adopt a genuine policy of non-interference.  But if the country’s various political forces cannot agree on what to do in Syria, at least they might agree on a sensible approach toward the refugee tragedy”, says Program Director Robert Malley.  “Such a population influx would be staggering anywhere, but with Lebanon’s institutional frailty, scant resources and highly sensitive sectarian balance, it is a nightmare”.

FULL REPORT

1 Apr
CrisisWatch N°116 | 01 April 2013
In the Central African Republic, a peace deal signed two months ago in Libreville collapsed as the Seleka rebel alliance, having repeatedly violated the ceasefire, seized the capital Bangui on 24 March. President Francois Bozizé fled to Cameroon. Seleka leader Michel Djotodia declared himself president and suspended the constitution and National Assembly. The African Union condemned Seleka’s “unconstitutional change” of government, suspending CAR’s membership and imposing sanctions against Seleka’s leaders. Despite its rapid seizure of power, the Seleka coalition appears fragile and prone to fragmentation, prompting fears that factions may take up arms again. Crisis Group identifies a conflict risk for Central African Republic.
Tensions continued to escalate on the Korean peninsula. The UN Security Council’s 7 March resolution condemning North Korea’s February nuclear test prompted Pyongyang to threaten pre-emptive nuclear strikes against “invaders”. North Korea announced that it would no longer be bound by the 1953 Korean War armistice, and cut off communications hotlines with South Korea and the UN Command in Seoul. The North Korean army ordered all its rocket and long-range artillery units to be combat-ready and targeting U.S. bases and territory, and the government declared North Korea to be in a “state of war” with South Korea. In a show of force the U.S. flew B-52 and B-2 bombers over South Korea and deployed F-22 stealth fighters to the South as part of an ongoing military exercise. On 31 March, a rare Central Committee meeting in Pyongyang declared nuclear weapons are non-negotiable and North Korea’s nuclear status should be written into law.
In a new outbreak of intercommunal violence in Myanmar in the central town of Meiktila on 20-22 March, more than 40 people were killed and over 12,000 displaced, and hundreds of mainly Muslim-owned buildings destroyed, in attacks by Buddhist mobs. President Thein Sein imposed a state of emergency in the area and deployed the military to restore calm. Amid speculation that the attacks were pre-planned by extremists, there was widespread concern as the violence spread to towns and villages in other parts of the country in the following days, although there were no reported casualties from these other incidents.
The political uncertainty and paralysis gripping Lebanon worsened with the abrupt resignation of Prime Minister Najib Mikati on 22 March following a standoff with Hizbollah. Political instability further fed ongoing sectarian tensions and clashes, mainly in the southern town of Saida and the northern city of Tripoli, where a dozen people were killed in clashes between Sunni and Alawite militants 22-24 March. Regular cross-border shelling by Syria continued, and the Syrian regime for the first time launched air strikes inside Lebanon.
Within Syria the first credible reports emerged of chemical weapons use in the ongoing conflict. The government and rebels accused each other of firing a rocket loaded with chemical agents near Aleppo on 19 March, and the opposition reported two people killed in an alleged chemical missile attack on Adra, near Damascus.
Iraq’s political crisis again deepened in March. Widespread demonstrations in Sunni areas of the country have met an increasingly hardline security response, with security forces killing two Sunni protesters in Mosul on 8 March. Finance Minister Rafie al-Issawi resigned his post, as did Agriculture Minister Ezz al-Din al-Dawla, in solidarity with the protesters. Meanwhile Iraq’s parliament relied exclusively on votes from the Shia’s political blocs to pass the 2013 budget law, illustrating Baghdad’s increasingly sectarian politics.
As the stalemate between Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi and the opposition continued, violent clashes between opponents and supporters of the ruling Muslim Brotherhood broke out outside the Islamists’ headquarters in Cairo on 22 March. Subsequent days also saw violent protests. President Morsi warned that he would take “necessary measures” to “protect the nation”, and the prosecutor general ordered the arrest of several activists. The violence took place as political demonstrations and riots in Egypt are increasingly giving way to socio-economic protest in the face of fuel shortages, inflation and price increases.
Nepal’s main parties ended months of political deadlock on 14 March. They agreed to hold elections to a new Constituent Assembly by 21 June under an interim election government, led by Supreme Court chief justice Khil Raj Regmi. The interim government will comprise retired bureaucrats, and be guided by a political committee of the four largest parties. If elections are not held in June, the government will be extended until 15 December.
Prospects for peace between Turkey’s government and Kurdish insurgents are improving after five months of negotiations between the national intelligence agency and the jailed leader of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan. The 21 March call by Öcalan for an eventual ceasefire and withdrawal to outside Turkish borders – and PKK’s military leader Murat Karayılan’s subsequent acceptance of the idea – are particularly positive signs.
FULL CRISISWATCH
Photo: hdptcar/Flickr

CrisisWatch N°116 | 01 April 2013

In the Central African Republic, a peace deal signed two months ago in Libreville collapsed as the Seleka rebel alliance, having repeatedly violated the ceasefire, seized the capital Bangui on 24 March. President Francois Bozizé fled to Cameroon. Seleka leader Michel Djotodia declared himself president and suspended the constitution and National Assembly. The African Union condemned Seleka’s “unconstitutional change” of government, suspending CAR’s membership and imposing sanctions against Seleka’s leaders. Despite its rapid seizure of power, the Seleka coalition appears fragile and prone to fragmentation, prompting fears that factions may take up arms again. Crisis Group identifies a conflict risk for Central African Republic.

Tensions continued to escalate on the Korean peninsula. The UN Security Council’s 7 March resolution condemning North Korea’s February nuclear test prompted Pyongyang to threaten pre-emptive nuclear strikes against “invaders”. North Korea announced that it would no longer be bound by the 1953 Korean War armistice, and cut off communications hotlines with South Korea and the UN Command in Seoul. The North Korean army ordered all its rocket and long-range artillery units to be combat-ready and targeting U.S. bases and territory, and the government declared North Korea to be in a “state of war” with South Korea. In a show of force the U.S. flew B-52 and B-2 bombers over South Korea and deployed F-22 stealth fighters to the South as part of an ongoing military exercise. On 31 March, a rare Central Committee meeting in Pyongyang declared nuclear weapons are non-negotiable and North Korea’s nuclear status should be written into law.

In a new outbreak of intercommunal violence in Myanmar in the central town of Meiktila on 20-22 March, more than 40 people were killed and over 12,000 displaced, and hundreds of mainly Muslim-owned buildings destroyed, in attacks by Buddhist mobs. President Thein Sein imposed a state of emergency in the area and deployed the military to restore calm. Amid speculation that the attacks were pre-planned by extremists, there was widespread concern as the violence spread to towns and villages in other parts of the country in the following days, although there were no reported casualties from these other incidents.

The political uncertainty and paralysis gripping Lebanon worsened with the abrupt resignation of Prime Minister Najib Mikati on 22 March following a standoff with Hizbollah. Political instability further fed ongoing sectarian tensions and clashes, mainly in the southern town of Saida and the northern city of Tripoli, where a dozen people were killed in clashes between Sunni and Alawite militants 22-24 March. Regular cross-border shelling by Syria continued, and the Syrian regime for the first time launched air strikes inside Lebanon.

Within Syria the first credible reports emerged of chemical weapons use in the ongoing conflict. The government and rebels accused each other of firing a rocket loaded with chemical agents near Aleppo on 19 March, and the opposition reported two people killed in an alleged chemical missile attack on Adra, near Damascus.

Iraq’s political crisis again deepened in March. Widespread demonstrations in Sunni areas of the country have met an increasingly hardline security response, with security forces killing two Sunni protesters in Mosul on 8 March. Finance Minister Rafie al-Issawi resigned his post, as did Agriculture Minister Ezz al-Din al-Dawla, in solidarity with the protesters. Meanwhile Iraq’s parliament relied exclusively on votes from the Shia’s political blocs to pass the 2013 budget law, illustrating Baghdad’s increasingly sectarian politics.

As the stalemate between Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi and the opposition continued, violent clashes between opponents and supporters of the ruling Muslim Brotherhood broke out outside the Islamists’ headquarters in Cairo on 22 March. Subsequent days also saw violent protests. President Morsi warned that he would take “necessary measures” to “protect the nation”, and the prosecutor general ordered the arrest of several activists. The violence took place as political demonstrations and riots in Egypt are increasingly giving way to socio-economic protest in the face of fuel shortages, inflation and price increases.

Nepal’s main parties ended months of political deadlock on 14 March. They agreed to hold elections to a new Constituent Assembly by 21 June under an interim election government, led by Supreme Court chief justice Khil Raj Regmi. The interim government will comprise retired bureaucrats, and be guided by a political committee of the four largest parties. If elections are not held in June, the government will be extended until 15 December.

Prospects for peace between Turkey’s government and Kurdish insurgents are improving after five months of negotiations between the national intelligence agency and the jailed leader of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan. The 21 March call by Öcalan for an eventual ceasefire and withdrawal to outside Turkish borders – and PKK’s military leader Murat Karayılan’s subsequent acceptance of the idea – are particularly positive signs.

FULL CRISISWATCH

Photo: hdptcar/Flickr

1 Mar
CrisisWatch N°115  |  (01 Mar 2013)
The assassination on 6 February of opposition leader Chokri Belaïd sparked Tunisia’s worst political crisis since the 2011 revolution. The killing triggered mass protests throughout the country against the ruling Islamist party An-Nahda, and in turn counter-protests by An-Nahda supporters. Having dissolved the government in response to the assassination, Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali later resigned after his plan to form an interim cabinet of technocrats collapsed in the face of opposition from his own An-Nahda party.
Syria’s conflict continued to exact a horrific toll, with the number of dead, wounded and displaced rising. The Assad regime further escalated violence, reportedly firing ballistic missiles into civilian neighbourhoods, while reports also emerged of its mistreatment of prisoners; the rebels continued to make steady gains; signs of intensifying communal and sectarian friction continued to emerge. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees called the humanitarian situation “dramatic beyond description”. As yet there is little sign of progress in advancing a political solution to the crisis.
The Syrian conflict continues to threaten to destabilise neighbouring Lebanon. Ever more refugees flow across the border and Hizbollah appears increasingly sucked into the fighting. Meanwhile recent controversy over a proposed new electoral law exposed rising sectarianism and mistrust between the various Lebanese communities.
In Yemen, tensions between southern separatists on the one hand and state security forces and the Islamist party, Islah, on the other reached their highest levels since early 2012, and could lead to further violence. Clashes between separatist protesters and security forces in the South left at least six people dead. The UN Security Council warned that the actions of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and separatist leader Ali Salim al-Bid threatened to undermine the country’s democratic transition.
North Korea conducted its third nuclear test on 12 February, a reaction to the UN Security Council’s January resolution condemning its satellite launch last December. As the Security Council held immediate emergency talks, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the nuclear test as “deeply destabilising”. China also declared publicly its “firm opposition” to the test and summoned the North Korean ambassador to Beijing to express its dissatisfaction.
Tension increased ahead of Guinea’s forthcoming legislative elections. The electoral commission, accelerating its preparations for the vote scheduled for 12 May, controversially validated the choice of two companies to undertake a revision of voter rolls. The opposition, who believe the companies are open to political pressure, responded by withdrawing from electoral preparations, and opposition supporters protested in Conakry and other cities.
In Bangladesh, violent Islamist protests against the country’s 1971 war crimes tribunal intensified, as protesters faced off against a popular movement in support of death sentences for those accused, including senior leaders of the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami. One of the organisers of the demonstrations in support of death sentences was hacked to death in a suspected Jamaat-e-Islami attack mid-February. Dozens have been killed in clashes since the tribunal sentenced a Jamaat-e-Islami leader to death on 28 February, and violence was continuing. The government faces growing calls to ban Jamaat-e-Islami.
In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe announced that the referendum on a new constitution would be held on 16 March, as worrying reports emerged of politically-motivated violence and intimidation, and of raids on non-governmental organisations (NGOs), confiscation of their documents and equipment, and police allegations that 99 per cent of NGOs are engaged in regime change.
FULL CRISISWATCH
Photo: Bronski Beat/Flickr

CrisisWatch N°115  |  (01 Mar 2013)

The assassination on 6 February of opposition leader Chokri Belaïd sparked Tunisia’s worst political crisis since the 2011 revolution. The killing triggered mass protests throughout the country against the ruling Islamist party An-Nahda, and in turn counter-protests by An-Nahda supporters. Having dissolved the government in response to the assassination, Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali later resigned after his plan to form an interim cabinet of technocrats collapsed in the face of opposition from his own An-Nahda party.

Syria’s conflict continued to exact a horrific toll, with the number of dead, wounded and displaced rising. The Assad regime further escalated violence, reportedly firing ballistic missiles into civilian neighbourhoods, while reports also emerged of its mistreatment of prisoners; the rebels continued to make steady gains; signs of intensifying communal and sectarian friction continued to emerge. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees called the humanitarian situation “dramatic beyond description”. As yet there is little sign of progress in advancing a political solution to the crisis.

The Syrian conflict continues to threaten to destabilise neighbouring Lebanon. Ever more refugees flow across the border and Hizbollah appears increasingly sucked into the fighting. Meanwhile recent controversy over a proposed new electoral law exposed rising sectarianism and mistrust between the various Lebanese communities.

In Yemen, tensions between southern separatists on the one hand and state security forces and the Islamist party, Islah, on the other reached their highest levels since early 2012, and could lead to further violence. Clashes between separatist protesters and security forces in the South left at least six people dead. The UN Security Council warned that the actions of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and separatist leader Ali Salim al-Bid threatened to undermine the country’s democratic transition.

North Korea conducted its third nuclear test on 12 February, a reaction to the UN Security Council’s January resolution condemning its satellite launch last December. As the Security Council held immediate emergency talks, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the nuclear test as “deeply destabilising”. China also declared publicly its “firm opposition” to the test and summoned the North Korean ambassador to Beijing to express its dissatisfaction.

Tension increased ahead of Guinea’s forthcoming legislative elections. The electoral commission, accelerating its preparations for the vote scheduled for 12 May, controversially validated the choice of two companies to undertake a revision of voter rolls. The opposition, who believe the companies are open to political pressure, responded by withdrawing from electoral preparations, and opposition supporters protested in Conakry and other cities.

In Bangladesh, violent Islamist protests against the country’s 1971 war crimes tribunal intensified, as protesters faced off against a popular movement in support of death sentences for those accused, including senior leaders of the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami. One of the organisers of the demonstrations in support of death sentences was hacked to death in a suspected Jamaat-e-Islami attack mid-February. Dozens have been killed in clashes since the tribunal sentenced a Jamaat-e-Islami leader to death on 28 February, and violence was continuing. The government faces growing calls to ban Jamaat-e-Islami.

In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe announced that the referendum on a new constitution would be held on 16 March, as worrying reports emerged of politically-motivated violence and intimidation, and of raids on non-governmental organisations (NGOs), confiscation of their documents and equipment, and police allegations that 99 per cent of NGOs are engaged in regime change.

FULL CRISISWATCH

Photo: Bronski Beat/Flickr

4 Jan
from 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2013 | Foreign Policy
by Louise Arbour
Syria and Lebanon
The conflict in Syria has continued to take numerous ugly turns, and will probably continue to do so. The regime has proved difficult to topple, and its foes even harder to eradicate. As those in the region and further afield speculate about the coming fall of the regime — the initial post-Assad stages carry enormous risks, not only for Syria’s people but for the region at large. Just getting through the winter will be hard, as growing numbers of Syrians are displaced, entire neighborhoods are leveled, state institutions further erode, and international aid falls short.
President Bashar al-Assad’s approach in dealing with those opposed to his rule tore Syrian society apart. The opposition’s gradual radicalization in response has fuelled a self-reinforcing cycle in which both sides have increasingly relied on military solutions over political ones. As Syria’s religious and ethnic communities have polarized, regime supporters have dug in their heels — committing atrocities spurred on by their perception of facing a “kill or be killed” situation, and their fears of large-scale retribution when Assad falls.
The violence devouring Syria has also made it fertile ground for hardline Sunni Islamists, who have managed to rally around them those disenchanted with the West — not least thanks to their access to Gulf Arab funding and jihadi military knowhow acquired elsewhere. To reverse this dangerous trend, the opposition needs to articulate a more credible, less nihilistic vision for the future, members of the international community need to coordinate their policies, and a perilous military struggle needs to move towards a political solution.
Inevitably, and especially due to the sectarian undertone this conflict has acquired, Syria’s war is leaking over its border into Lebanon. History bodes ill: Beirut seldom has been immune to the influence of Damascus. It is crucial that Lebanon’s leaders address the fundamental shortfalls of their governing structure, which exacerbate factionalism and leave the country vulnerable to the chaos next door.
FULL ARTICLE (Foreign Policy)
Photo: James Gordon/Flickr

from 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2013 | Foreign Policy

by Louise Arbour

Syria and Lebanon

The conflict in Syria has continued to take numerous ugly turns, and will probably continue to do so. The regime has proved difficult to topple, and its foes even harder to eradicate. As those in the region and further afield speculate about the coming fall of the regime — the initial post-Assad stages carry enormous risks, not only for Syria’s people but for the region at large. Just getting through the winter will be hard, as growing numbers of Syrians are displaced, entire neighborhoods are leveled, state institutions further erode, and international aid falls short.

President Bashar al-Assad’s approach in dealing with those opposed to his rule tore Syrian society apart. The opposition’s gradual radicalization in response has fuelled a self-reinforcing cycle in which both sides have increasingly relied on military solutions over political ones. As Syria’s religious and ethnic communities have polarized, regime supporters have dug in their heels — committing atrocities spurred on by their perception of facing a “kill or be killed” situation, and their fears of large-scale retribution when Assad falls.

The violence devouring Syria has also made it fertile ground for hardline Sunni Islamists, who have managed to rally around them those disenchanted with the West — not least thanks to their access to Gulf Arab funding and jihadi military knowhow acquired elsewhere. To reverse this dangerous trend, the opposition needs to articulate a more credible, less nihilistic vision for the future, members of the international community need to coordinate their policies, and a perilous military struggle needs to move towards a political solution.

Inevitably, and especially due to the sectarian undertone this conflict has acquired, Syria’s war is leaking over its border into Lebanon. History bodes ill: Beirut seldom has been immune to the influence of Damascus. It is crucial that Lebanon’s leaders address the fundamental shortfalls of their governing structure, which exacerbate factionalism and leave the country vulnerable to the chaos next door.

FULL ARTICLE (Foreign Policy)

Photo: James Gordon/Flickr

7 Dec
Weekly Update | International Crisis Group
The week of 3 December 2012
Reports: Philippines
Commentary: Lebanon & Syria, Israel/Palestine
Video: International Crisis Group
Quotes: Syria, Uzbekistan, Guinea Bissau, Turkey, North Korea
REPORTS
The Philippines: Breakthrough in Mindanao
The next round of talks between the Philippines’ largest Muslim insurgent group and the government is a crucial step towards implementing a sweeping peace agreement signed in October. (5 December)
More reports
COMMENTARY
التوازنات الهشة تستدعي سوريا إلى لبنان - من عهد الوصاية إلى زمن الرهانات 
سحر أطرش، لوموند ديبلوماتيك النشرة العربية، ٥ دسمبر
Abbas’ New York Minute - The Peace Process after the UN Vote 
Robert Blecher, Foreign Affairs, 1 December
إسرائيل وحماس في شرق أوسط جديد 
روبرت بلشر وناثان ثرال، القدس العربي، ٣٠ نوفمبر
VIDEOS
We Are the International Crisis Group 
Watch our new short video. (14 November) 
QUOTES
“There is the risk of the total destruction of Damascus. The regime is well entrenched in some key parts of Damascus and the opposition is unable to come up with a political vision to offer an exit to the bulk of people fighting for the regime.” 
Peter Harling, Project Director for Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, The Telegraph [UK], 6 December. 
“[Uzbekistan] is one of the most oppressive regimes in the world by any indicator you’d care to refer to. Does any of that - ie, the stuff that actually matters - change because Gulnara Karimova is now engaging people on Twitter? No, of course not.” 
Andrew Stroehlein, Communications Director, New Europe, 5 December. 
“Le processus de transition a peu avancé pour le moment. En outre, le pays est isolé : les autorités ne sont pas reconnues, et la quasi-totalité de l’aide internationale à l’Etat est suspendue.” 
Vincent Foucher, analyste pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest, cité dans Le Monde à propos de la situation en Guinée Bissau, 3 décembre. 
“There is nervousness in Turkey about the escalation of the conflict in Syria, and a way of making it seem like everything is going to be OK is Patriot missiles. It also brings in an element of NATO protection for Turkey.” 
Hugh Pope, Turkey and Cyprus Project Director, The Toronto Star, 3 December. 
“I don’t see signs of China fundamentally changing its policy on North Korea. There are limits to what [the US] can impose and enforce.” 
Daniel Pinkston, North East Asia Deputy Project Director, The Financial Times, 2 December. 

Weekly Update | International Crisis Group

The week of 3 December 2012

Reports: Philippines

Commentary: Lebanon & Syria, Israel/Palestine

Video: International Crisis Group

Quotes: Syria, Uzbekistan, Guinea Bissau, Turkey, North Korea

REPORTS

The Philippines: Breakthrough in Mindanao

The next round of talks between the Philippines’ largest Muslim insurgent group and the government is a crucial step towards implementing a sweeping peace agreement signed in October. (5 December)

More reports

COMMENTARY

التوازنات الهشة تستدعي سوريا إلى لبنان - من عهد الوصاية إلى زمن الرهانات 

سحر أطرش، لوموند ديبلوماتيك النشرة العربية، ٥ دسمبر

Abbas’ New York Minute - The Peace Process after the UN Vote 

Robert Blecher, Foreign Affairs, 1 December

إسرائيل وحماس في شرق أوسط جديد 

روبرت بلشر وناثان ثرال، القدس العربي، ٣٠ نوفمبر

VIDEOS

We Are the International Crisis Group 

Watch our new short video. (14 November) 

QUOTES

“There is the risk of the total destruction of Damascus. The regime is well entrenched in some key parts of Damascus and the opposition is unable to come up with a political vision to offer an exit to the bulk of people fighting for the regime.” 

Peter Harling, Project Director for Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, The Telegraph [UK], 6 December. 

“[Uzbekistan] is one of the most oppressive regimes in the world by any indicator you’d care to refer to. Does any of that - ie, the stuff that actually matters - change because Gulnara Karimova is now engaging people on Twitter? No, of course not.” 

Andrew Stroehlein, Communications Director, New Europe, 5 December. 

“Le processus de transition a peu avancé pour le moment. En outre, le pays est isolé : les autorités ne sont pas reconnues, et la quasi-totalité de l’aide internationale à l’Etat est suspendue.” 

Vincent Foucher, analyste pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest, cité dans Le Monde à propos de la situation en Guinée Bissau, 3 décembre. 

“There is nervousness in Turkey about the escalation of the conflict in Syria, and a way of making it seem like everything is going to be OK is Patriot missiles. It also brings in an element of NATO protection for Turkey.” 

Hugh Pope, Turkey and Cyprus Project Director, The Toronto Star, 3 December. 

“I don’t see signs of China fundamentally changing its policy on North Korea. There are limits to what [the US] can impose and enforce.” 

Daniel Pinkston, North East Asia Deputy Project Director, The Financial Times, 2 December. 

3 Dec
Assir for Future: threat or opportunity? | Now Lebanon
By Shane Farrell, Amani Hamad
While the firebrand Sidon cleric Ahmad al-Assir steals the media spotlight, a more pronounced emergence of Sunni Islamists is occurring across North Lebanon. A “Sunni Islamist awakening” is how a November report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) terms it, describing how Lebanese Islamists in the North are identifying with their counterparts fighting in the Syrian conflict and have become emboldened, wealthier and better connected since the battle between the Syrian Assad regime and anti-government rebels began in March 2011.
FULL ARTICLE (Now Lebanon)
Photo: Sodipodi’s Clipart Gallery/Wikimedia Commons

Assir for Future: threat or opportunity? | Now Lebanon

By Shane Farrell, Amani Hamad

While the firebrand Sidon cleric Ahmad al-Assir steals the media spotlight, a more pronounced emergence of Sunni Islamists is occurring across North Lebanon. A “Sunni Islamist awakening” is how a November report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) terms it, describing how Lebanese Islamists in the North are identifying with their counterparts fighting in the Syrian conflict and have become emboldened, wealthier and better connected since the battle between the Syrian Assad regime and anti-government rebels began in March 2011.

FULL ARTICLE (Now Lebanon)

Photo: Sodipodi’s Clipart Gallery/Wikimedia Commons