Showing posts tagged as "Hamas"

Showing posts tagged Hamas

26 Mar
The Next Round in Gaza
Middle East Report N°149 | 25 Mar 2014
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The ceasefire between Israel and Gaza has eroded during the past several months and recently threatened to come to an abrupt end. The day after three members of Islamic Jihad were killed by Israel in a border clash on 11 March 2014, the group, apparently in coordination with Hamas, launched the largest salvo of rockets toward Israel since the last major escalation (known in Israel as Operation Pillar of Defence), in November 2012. In a little over a day’s mediation, Egypt restored quiet. But with Hamas’s fortunes declining and Gaza suffering its worst isolation and economic constriction in years, it is likely a matter of time until a flare-up escalates to major conflagration – unless the sides reach an understanding to extend a fragile quiet. Given Hamas’s isolation and worsening relations with Cairo, it is hard to imagine full implementation of the ceasefire Egypt brokered to end the 2012 fighting. But a rump deal, comprised of that ceasefire’s core elements, still could lessen the chance that Hamas and Israel will be dragged into a conflict neither currently desires, while helping both to secure advantages beyond the Gaza-Israel theatre.
Periodic escalations between Israel and Gaza militants are the rule, not the exception. Their shared border has witnessed regular, low-scale violence punctuated by short, intense escalations, typically when one or both sides feel the implicit rules of engagement have been undercut. Hamas and Israel have been headed toward such a clash since 3 July 2013, when Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was deposed, and Cairo, as part of its campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi-jihadis in Sinai, initiated a push to further isolate Gaza by closing the tunnels under its border with Egypt. Among Hamas’s limited tools for dealing with its downward spiral is directly participating in a military escalation in the hope that a new crisis would bring about at least temporary alleviation of the closure; call the world’s attention to the resultant economic distress; increase sympathy for the territory in Egypt and elsewhere; and embarrass Egypt’s leaders about their role in immiserating Gaza.
For the time being, Hamas has rejected this option, as it cannot afford a new round of hostilities. It is politically isolated and in severe economic distress. It can neither count on Egypt’s sympathies nor easily rearm during or after a future crisis. Hamas is hamstrung by the burdens of governance and by the fact that it would bear the brunt of any Israeli offensive. As a result, it chose a softer and less risky alternative this month: giving greater leeway to other factions that wish to attack Israel.
Islamic Jihad, with its massive retaliation for the killing of its militants, saw an opportunity to push to the forefront of the national struggle. In contrast with Hamas, it demonstrated continuing fidelity to the principle of resistance, and, by negotiating a ceasefire directly with Egypt, emerged from Hamas’s shadow, positioning itself as a regional player. Hamas too saw an advantage in the escalation: sending a message that Gaza would not remain passive in the face of isolation and misery.
Hamas leaders reasoned, accurately, that so long as they stayed out of the conflagration and the rocket fire was limited in distance and duration, a major operation would be avoided. Israel also calculated correctly, calibrating its pressure on Gaza so as to signal its seriousness to Hamas, but not strike it so hard as to provoke a much larger confrontation or threaten its control, to which Israel sees no desirable and realistic alternative. Such assessments are fraught with risk. Neither side currently wants a large-scale confrontation, and both hope to maintain or at least extend a fragile equilibrium, but the two major Israeli operations in the past six years, and numerous mini-escalations in between, demonstrate the likelihood of an eventual miscalculation.
If neither side wants to fight, neither do they intend to press for peace. Both are convinced the next round is coming, so will not take militarily disadvantageous steps. But while far from a robust ceasefire, they could unilaterally implement a more limited arrangement that satisfies core, short-terms needs. Gaza has three. What passes for normal life requires sufficient fuel, particularly diesel for electricity; building materials that enable economic activity and maintain basic infrastructure; and a reliably open Gaza-Egypt crossing at Rafah, for entry and egress of persons (goods are provided by Israel). For Israel, the key is stopping rockets. Neither side can get all it wants: Gazans likely will continue to find the border area off limits, fishing zones constricted and, most important, imports restricted and exports blocked – as they have been, increasingly, since the second intifada. Israel, under any scenario except an unlikely Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, cannot completely stop rockets that have been falling on its territory for nearly as long. However, both sides can regain what they in the past have demonstrated a willingness to live with.
A realistic assessment requires acknowledging that military operations will continue on both sides. The question, for now, is how to keep these within relatively narrow bounds, thus saving lives and creating space for dealing with broader political issues. The more Hamas can provide a semblance of Gaza’s basic needs, the better it will be able to enforce a political consensus among the factions to stop the vast majority of rockets and halt entirely the firing of those with the longest ranges and heaviest payloads. Its police can handle much of the rest, though they cannot prevent every freelancer attempting an attack without factional approval.
Meanwhile, Palestinians, Israelis and the international community can lay the groundwork for Palestinian reconciliation and rebuild the fundamentals of a peace process in which both sides have long since lost hope. More broadly, what is good for Gaza, and even Hamas, could turn out to be good as well for Israel and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. With the U.S. looking to extend Israeli-Palestinian negotiations past April, Abbas could demand steps to ease Gaza’s closure and improve its economy as a condition. That would improve his standing in Gaza, especially important now that his detractors within Fatah, particularly those from Gaza, are openly campaigning against him. Israel, should it accept Abbas’s demands, could earn credit for taking action that reduces the risk of a new escalation, while lowering the other costs it might have to pay to extend talks.
In all things Israeli-Palestinian, even modest goals are highly ambitious, and in Gaza, doubly so. Within a fluid and evolving region, Gaza is a venue where various states and actors play out their allegiances and rivalries, including Salafis of several stripes; Egypt; the Muslim Brotherhood in the form of its local affiliate, Hamas; Iran; Hizbollah; the Gulf states; and claimants to power within Fatah. It is a central impediment to a more durable ceasefire agreement that while neither Israel nor Hamas now has what it wants, both have what matters most to them in the short term. Israel has a ceasefire, albeit imperfectly upheld; Hamas has control of Gaza, even if under difficult conditions. Neither wishes to give even a little more for what it already has. But if they do not, both could lose what they now possess.
Jerusalem/Gaza City/Brussels, 25 March 2014
FULL REPORT
Photo: amillionwaystob/flickr

The Next Round in Gaza

Middle East Report N°149 | 25 Mar 2014

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ceasefire between Israel and Gaza has eroded during the past several months and recently threatened to come to an abrupt end. The day after three members of Islamic Jihad were killed by Israel in a border clash on 11 March 2014, the group, apparently in coordination with Hamas, launched the largest salvo of rockets toward Israel since the last major escalation (known in Israel as Operation Pillar of Defence), in November 2012. In a little over a day’s mediation, Egypt restored quiet. But with Hamas’s fortunes declining and Gaza suffering its worst isolation and economic constriction in years, it is likely a matter of time until a flare-up escalates to major conflagration – unless the sides reach an understanding to extend a fragile quiet. Given Hamas’s isolation and worsening relations with Cairo, it is hard to imagine full implementation of the ceasefire Egypt brokered to end the 2012 fighting. But a rump deal, comprised of that ceasefire’s core elements, still could lessen the chance that Hamas and Israel will be dragged into a conflict neither currently desires, while helping both to secure advantages beyond the Gaza-Israel theatre.

Periodic escalations between Israel and Gaza militants are the rule, not the exception. Their shared border has witnessed regular, low-scale violence punctuated by short, intense escalations, typically when one or both sides feel the implicit rules of engagement have been undercut. Hamas and Israel have been headed toward such a clash since 3 July 2013, when Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was deposed, and Cairo, as part of its campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi-jihadis in Sinai, initiated a push to further isolate Gaza by closing the tunnels under its border with Egypt. Among Hamas’s limited tools for dealing with its downward spiral is directly participating in a military escalation in the hope that a new crisis would bring about at least temporary alleviation of the closure; call the world’s attention to the resultant economic distress; increase sympathy for the territory in Egypt and elsewhere; and embarrass Egypt’s leaders about their role in immiserating Gaza.

For the time being, Hamas has rejected this option, as it cannot afford a new round of hostilities. It is politically isolated and in severe economic distress. It can neither count on Egypt’s sympathies nor easily rearm during or after a future crisis. Hamas is hamstrung by the burdens of governance and by the fact that it would bear the brunt of any Israeli offensive. As a result, it chose a softer and less risky alternative this month: giving greater leeway to other factions that wish to attack Israel.

Islamic Jihad, with its massive retaliation for the killing of its militants, saw an opportunity to push to the forefront of the national struggle. In contrast with Hamas, it demonstrated continuing fidelity to the principle of resistance, and, by negotiating a ceasefire directly with Egypt, emerged from Hamas’s shadow, positioning itself as a regional player. Hamas too saw an advantage in the escalation: sending a message that Gaza would not remain passive in the face of isolation and misery.

Hamas leaders reasoned, accurately, that so long as they stayed out of the conflagration and the rocket fire was limited in distance and duration, a major operation would be avoided. Israel also calculated correctly, calibrating its pressure on Gaza so as to signal its seriousness to Hamas, but not strike it so hard as to provoke a much larger confrontation or threaten its control, to which Israel sees no desirable and realistic alternative. Such assessments are fraught with risk. Neither side currently wants a large-scale confrontation, and both hope to maintain or at least extend a fragile equilibrium, but the two major Israeli operations in the past six years, and numerous mini-escalations in between, demonstrate the likelihood of an eventual miscalculation.

If neither side wants to fight, neither do they intend to press for peace. Both are convinced the next round is coming, so will not take militarily disadvantageous steps. But while far from a robust ceasefire, they could unilaterally implement a more limited arrangement that satisfies core, short-terms needs. Gaza has three. What passes for normal life requires sufficient fuel, particularly diesel for electricity; building materials that enable economic activity and maintain basic infrastructure; and a reliably open Gaza-Egypt crossing at Rafah, for entry and egress of persons (goods are provided by Israel). For Israel, the key is stopping rockets. Neither side can get all it wants: Gazans likely will continue to find the border area off limits, fishing zones constricted and, most important, imports restricted and exports blocked – as they have been, increasingly, since the second intifada. Israel, under any scenario except an unlikely Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, cannot completely stop rockets that have been falling on its territory for nearly as long. However, both sides can regain what they in the past have demonstrated a willingness to live with.

A realistic assessment requires acknowledging that military operations will continue on both sides. The question, for now, is how to keep these within relatively narrow bounds, thus saving lives and creating space for dealing with broader political issues. The more Hamas can provide a semblance of Gaza’s basic needs, the better it will be able to enforce a political consensus among the factions to stop the vast majority of rockets and halt entirely the firing of those with the longest ranges and heaviest payloads. Its police can handle much of the rest, though they cannot prevent every freelancer attempting an attack without factional approval.

Meanwhile, Palestinians, Israelis and the international community can lay the groundwork for Palestinian reconciliation and rebuild the fundamentals of a peace process in which both sides have long since lost hope. More broadly, what is good for Gaza, and even Hamas, could turn out to be good as well for Israel and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. With the U.S. looking to extend Israeli-Palestinian negotiations past April, Abbas could demand steps to ease Gaza’s closure and improve its economy as a condition. That would improve his standing in Gaza, especially important now that his detractors within Fatah, particularly those from Gaza, are openly campaigning against him. Israel, should it accept Abbas’s demands, could earn credit for taking action that reduces the risk of a new escalation, while lowering the other costs it might have to pay to extend talks.

In all things Israeli-Palestinian, even modest goals are highly ambitious, and in Gaza, doubly so. Within a fluid and evolving region, Gaza is a venue where various states and actors play out their allegiances and rivalries, including Salafis of several stripes; Egypt; the Muslim Brotherhood in the form of its local affiliate, Hamas; Iran; Hizbollah; the Gulf states; and claimants to power within Fatah. It is a central impediment to a more durable ceasefire agreement that while neither Israel nor Hamas now has what it wants, both have what matters most to them in the short term. Israel has a ceasefire, albeit imperfectly upheld; Hamas has control of Gaza, even if under difficult conditions. Neither wishes to give even a little more for what it already has. But if they do not, both could lose what they now possess.

Jerusalem/Gaza City/Brussels, 25 March 2014

FULL REPORT

Photo: amillionwaystob/flickr

18 Feb
Palestinians in Gaza Strip resent being left out of peace talks | Kate Linthicum
Like many Palestinians, Marwan Hissi has closely followed reports of peace negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.
An unemployed father of five living in a refugee community in the Gaza Strip, Hissi says he has a question for American negotiators leading the talks: “Where’s Hamas?”
The Islamic militant movement, which seized control of Gaza in 2007, has been excluded from the process as U.S. officials work out a preliminary agreement on key issues in the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel, the United States and the European Union refuse to engage with Hamas, which does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and which they consider a terrorist group.
While all eyes are trained on Netanyahu and Abbas as U.S. Secretary of State John F. Kerry prepares to present a deal, the issue of Hamas, which could make or break the implementation of any agreement, looms uncomfortably in the background.
FULL ARTICLE (L.A. Times)
Photo: J McDowell/flickr

Palestinians in Gaza Strip resent being left out of peace talks | Kate Linthicum

Like many Palestinians, Marwan Hissi has closely followed reports of peace negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

An unemployed father of five living in a refugee community in the Gaza Strip, Hissi says he has a question for American negotiators leading the talks: “Where’s Hamas?”

The Islamic militant movement, which seized control of Gaza in 2007, has been excluded from the process as U.S. officials work out a preliminary agreement on key issues in the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel, the United States and the European Union refuse to engage with Hamas, which does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and which they consider a terrorist group.

While all eyes are trained on Netanyahu and Abbas as U.S. Secretary of State John F. Kerry prepares to present a deal, the issue of Hamas, which could make or break the implementation of any agreement, looms uncomfortably in the background.

FULL ARTICLE (L.A. Times)

Photo: J McDowell/flickr

2 Dec
U.S. Challenges in a Changed Middle East | Council on Foreign Relations
by Bernard Gwertzman
The events in the Middle East continue to rapidly unfold, providing difficulties for U.S. policy in the region, whether it is the decades-long conflict between Israel and Palestine, the rise of Islamists, the conflict in Syria, or tensions with Iran. Middle East expert Robert Malley says, “With Islamists in power in Egypt, with Hamas more powerful than it was the last time it was at war with Israel [2008-09], the United States is trying to figure out its place in a region that is no longer the one it was accustomed to.” And in Syria, although a negotiated end to Bashar al-Assad’s regime is preferable, “unfortunately, it almost certainly is not the most likely” way the conflict will end. He says the United States is conflicted over accepting Egyptian help in ending the recent Israel-Hamas attacks while it is also uncomfortable with the domestic policies of the Muslim Brotherhood.
FULL ARTICLE (Council on Foreign Relations)
Photo: Talk Radio News Service/Flickr

U.S. Challenges in a Changed Middle East | Council on Foreign Relations

by Bernard Gwertzman

The events in the Middle East continue to rapidly unfold, providing difficulties for U.S. policy in the region, whether it is the decades-long conflict between Israel and Palestine, the rise of Islamists, the conflict in Syria, or tensions with Iran. Middle East expert Robert Malley says, “With Islamists in power in Egypt, with Hamas more powerful than it was the last time it was at war with Israel [2008-09], the United States is trying to figure out its place in a region that is no longer the one it was accustomed to.” And in Syria, although a negotiated end to Bashar al-Assad’s regime is preferable, “unfortunately, it almost certainly is not the most likely” way the conflict will end. He says the United States is conflicted over accepting Egyptian help in ending the recent Israel-Hamas attacks while it is also uncomfortable with the domestic policies of the Muslim Brotherhood.

FULL ARTICLE (Council on Foreign Relations)

Photo: Talk Radio News Service/Flickr

28 Nov
"For its part, Hamas can claim a major triumph: it showed it would not be intimidated and has basked in unparalleled visits to Gaza by Arab officials. The ceasefire agreement promised greater access of Gaza to the outside world, a considerable and long-sought achievement."

from Crisis Group’s most recent report, Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East

"Israel’s military operation could be interpreted as a reply to rocket attacks. Yet, the chronology of events, precise targeting (eg, of Hamas’s principal military leader) and overwhelming response suggest more than that. Israeli decision-makers were delivering a message: if Hamas thinks it enjoys a cloak of immunity, if Cairo thinks it can deter Jerusalem, think again."

from Crisis Group’s most recent report, Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East

"In this first real-life test of the emerging regional order, protagonists sought to identify, clarify and, wherever possible, shape the rules of the game. The end result is a truce that looks very much like its predecessors, only this time guaranteed by a new Egypt and occurring in a transformed environment."

from Crisis Group’s most recent report, Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East

27 Nov
"If this was an old war, it was fought on a new battleground. It was the first Israeli-Arab confrontation since the wave of Arab uprisings hit in early 2011, and Islamists rose to power. Hamas was better equipped and battle-ready and had exchanged its partnership with U.S. foes for one with Washington’s allies."

from Crisis Group’s most recent report, Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East

Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East
Jerusalem/Gaza City/Cairo/Ramallah/Brussels  |   22 Nov 2012
The latest round of fighting between Israel and Hamas must move beyond the quick-fix solutions of conflicts past, or the seeds of a future flare-up will be sown today.
Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, assesses the outcome of the conflagration and the degree to which changes across the region, most notably a Muslim Brotherhood-governed Egypt, have altered the battlefield.
For Israel and Hamas, a key objective from the start was to mould the new landscape. Israel was keenly aware of the changes and determined to show that they changed nothing: that it retained both freedom of manoeuvre and Western support, and that it would not be hamstrung by concern over how an Islamist-ruled Egypt would react. The Islamist movement was waging that Egypt had become its strategic depth and that it was bolstered by the regional Islamist wave.
Egypt’s leaders faced a difficult balancing act. The Brotherhood must be responsive to a domestic constituency sympathetic to Gaza’s plight, but economic priorities mean it cannot alienate the West. President Morsi also had to contend with a security establishment that remains interested in maintaining working relations with Israel and ensuring Egypt does not assume responsibility for Gaza.
“This was an old, familiar war waged on a new, unfamiliar battleground. In that sense, it was the first real-life challenge faced by the regional order that has emerged out of the Arab uprisings”, says Robert Malley, Middle East and North Africa Program Director. “Protagonists were seeking to identify, clarify and, wherever possible, shape the rules of the game”.
The balance sheet is still somewhat murky. Israel showed it retained freedom of action, severely damaged Hamas’s military potential, illustrated the effectiveness of the anti-missile Iron Dome system, worked closely with the U.S. and, through it all, kept Egypt essentially in its old role. Yet, it had to agree to a ceasefire agreement that does not fulfil its goals, in part due to Egypt’s new profile and to U.S. pressure, itself a reflection of Washington’s concern about the new regional order.
Hamas showed it would not be intimidated, basked in unparalleled visits to Gaza by Arab officials and proved itself the central Palestinian player. The ceasefire agreement promises greater access of Gaza to the outside world, a considerable achievement if carried out. Yet if Arab rhetoric was more combative, the actions were somewhat stale. Egypt’s rulers offered little fundamentally new: outraged denunciations, mediation and cooperation with Washington.
For now, the immediate objective must be to ensure fighting truly stops and that other commitments – especially normalising Gaza’s economic situation – are met. History is grounds for scepticism, and many questions remain unanswered, but new Middle East dynamics offer greater hope: Cairo has an incentive to ensure success and has far more credibility and thus leverage with Hamas. Likewise, the U.S. and President Obama appear to have acquired new standing and leverage in Israel thanks to unquestioned support; those can be used to ensure compliance with the ceasefire.
Finally, two related issues must be addressed: the fate of the PA and of the non-Islamist national movement as well as the future of the peace process. A way needs to be found to restore the relevance and effectiveness of those left on the sidelines by the war, yet without whom prospects for a two-state solution likely will vanish. To this end, Cairo should renew its push toward Fatah-Hamas reconciliation.
“One thing is clear. The changing map of the Middle East has been kind neither to the non-Islamist side of the Palestinian national movement nor to prospects of a final settlement”, says Robert Blecher, Crisis Group’s Arab-Israeli Project Director.
“Now, Egypt should use its bolstered standing to pressure Fatah and Hamas, and take advantage of reaffirmed cooperation with the U.S. to persuade Washington to adopt a more flexible, pragmatic attitude toward Palestinian unity”, comments Nathan Thrall, Crisis Group Middle East Analyst.
FULL REPORT

Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East

Jerusalem/Gaza City/Cairo/Ramallah/Brussels  |   22 Nov 2012

The latest round of fighting between Israel and Hamas must move beyond the quick-fix solutions of conflicts past, or the seeds of a future flare-up will be sown today.

Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, assesses the outcome of the conflagration and the degree to which changes across the region, most notably a Muslim Brotherhood-governed Egypt, have altered the battlefield.

For Israel and Hamas, a key objective from the start was to mould the new landscape. Israel was keenly aware of the changes and determined to show that they changed nothing: that it retained both freedom of manoeuvre and Western support, and that it would not be hamstrung by concern over how an Islamist-ruled Egypt would react. The Islamist movement was waging that Egypt had become its strategic depth and that it was bolstered by the regional Islamist wave.

Egypt’s leaders faced a difficult balancing act. The Brotherhood must be responsive to a domestic constituency sympathetic to Gaza’s plight, but economic priorities mean it cannot alienate the West. President Morsi also had to contend with a security establishment that remains interested in maintaining working relations with Israel and ensuring Egypt does not assume responsibility for Gaza.

“This was an old, familiar war waged on a new, unfamiliar battleground. In that sense, it was the first real-life challenge faced by the regional order that has emerged out of the Arab uprisings”, says Robert Malley, Middle East and North Africa Program Director. “Protagonists were seeking to identify, clarify and, wherever possible, shape the rules of the game”.

The balance sheet is still somewhat murky. Israel showed it retained freedom of action, severely damaged Hamas’s military potential, illustrated the effectiveness of the anti-missile Iron Dome system, worked closely with the U.S. and, through it all, kept Egypt essentially in its old role. Yet, it had to agree to a ceasefire agreement that does not fulfil its goals, in part due to Egypt’s new profile and to U.S. pressure, itself a reflection of Washington’s concern about the new regional order.

Hamas showed it would not be intimidated, basked in unparalleled visits to Gaza by Arab officials and proved itself the central Palestinian player. The ceasefire agreement promises greater access of Gaza to the outside world, a considerable achievement if carried out. Yet if Arab rhetoric was more combative, the actions were somewhat stale. Egypt’s rulers offered little fundamentally new: outraged denunciations, mediation and cooperation with Washington.

For now, the immediate objective must be to ensure fighting truly stops and that other commitments – especially normalising Gaza’s economic situation – are met. History is grounds for scepticism, and many questions remain unanswered, but new Middle East dynamics offer greater hope: Cairo has an incentive to ensure success and has far more credibility and thus leverage with Hamas. Likewise, the U.S. and President Obama appear to have acquired new standing and leverage in Israel thanks to unquestioned support; those can be used to ensure compliance with the ceasefire.

Finally, two related issues must be addressed: the fate of the PA and of the non-Islamist national movement as well as the future of the peace process. A way needs to be found to restore the relevance and effectiveness of those left on the sidelines by the war, yet without whom prospects for a two-state solution likely will vanish. To this end, Cairo should renew its push toward Fatah-Hamas reconciliation.

“One thing is clear. The changing map of the Middle East has been kind neither to the non-Islamist side of the Palestinian national movement nor to prospects of a final settlement”, says Robert Blecher, Crisis Group’s Arab-Israeli Project Director.

“Now, Egypt should use its bolstered standing to pressure Fatah and Hamas, and take advantage of reaffirmed cooperation with the U.S. to persuade Washington to adopt a more flexible, pragmatic attitude toward Palestinian unity”, comments Nathan Thrall, Crisis Group Middle East Analyst.

FULL REPORT

20 Nov

Robert Malley, Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program Director, speaks with NPR’s On Point about Israel and Hamas.

(NPR’s On Point)

16 Nov
"It looks like it’s going to be a large escalation; it seems very likely that Hamas is going to retaliate strongly. They’ll probably use longer-range weapons than they’ve ever used. The real question is whether any of this is going to change the basic status quo in relations between Israel and Gaza, and I think the answer to that is probably ‘no’ unless it escalates to the point that Israel reoccupies parts of Gaza, which is always a possibility."

—Nathan Thrall, Crisis Group’s Jerusalem-based Middle East analyst, talks with Adam Chandler, editor of Tablet’s The Scroll, about Israel’s operation in Gaza