Showing posts tagged as "Conflict Resoultion"

Showing posts tagged Conflict Resoultion

2 May

We have to accept that we will live with conflict. We cannot aspire to eradicating it. Conflict comes from competition for access to resources, particularly in a world in which the institutions are not geared to an equitable distribution of resources and of wealth. So we will have conflict. The question is how to appease conflict, resolve it, without recourse to deadly, violent interaction.

Louise Arbour, Crisis Group’s President and CEO, in an interview with the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
Photo: svenwerk/Flickr

We have to accept that we will live with conflict. We cannot aspire to eradicating it. Conflict comes from competition for access to resources, particularly in a world in which the institutions are not geared to an equitable distribution of resources and of wealth. So we will have conflict. The question is how to appease conflict, resolve it, without recourse to deadly, violent interaction.

Louise Arbour, Crisis Group’s President and CEO, in an interview with the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs

Photo: svenwerk/Flickr


When we ask the question of whether things are getting better or worse, I think we need to be extremely specific about what things we’re talking about. They’re getting a lot better for some, not better at all for many, and considerably worse, I think, for those who can appreciate the difference and realize that they are not part of that progress.

Louise Arbour, Crisis Group’s President and CEO, in an interview with the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
Photo: United Nations Photo/Flickr

When we ask the question of whether things are getting better or worse, I think we need to be extremely specific about what things we’re talking about. They’re getting a lot better for some, not better at all for many, and considerably worse, I think, for those who can appreciate the difference and realize that they are not part of that progress.

Louise Arbour, Crisis Group’s President and CEO, in an interview with the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs

Photo: United Nations Photo/Flickr

I think we have fallen short, in a sense, by not capitalizing on the contribution and talent of half of the population of the world.

Louise Arbour, Crisis Group’s President and CEO, in an interview with the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs

"I think at the root of conflict is our inability to seriously address inequalities, inequalities within states, between people within their own states, inequalities between states, extremely inequitable and unequal distribution of the wealth of the planet…. We have still fallen short, considerably, of addressing that."

—Louise Arbour, Crisis Group’s President and CEO, in an interview with the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs

29 May
U.N. Security Council condemns Syria army attack in Houla | The Los Angeles Times
By Patrick J. McDonnell
The U.N. Security Council on Sunday condemned Syrian army artillery and tank barrages on a civilian neighborhood where 108 people, most of them women and children, were killed, suggesting in a carefully worded statement that government forces were largely responsible.As international outrage escalated, some viewed the carnage as a possible turning point in the conflict. The government and opposition groups exchanged blame for the massacre Friday in the township of Houla in western Homs province.The Security Council, meeting in an emergency session, said the “outrageous use of force against [the] civilian population” is a violation of a U.N. peace plan. It called on the government and its opponents to end violence, the U.N. said.The statement was approved after a lengthy discussion withRussia, an ally of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Russia, which holds a veto and has thwarted any U.N.-backed international intervention in Syria, gave its assent to a statement that distanced the Syrian government from the killings of those in Houla who died from shooting at close range or as a result of “severe physical abuse.”The U.N. said a new count indicated that 108 people were killed in Houla, including 49 children and 34 women. How many died from government shelling and how many perished from other causes was not clear.
FULL ARTICLE (The Los Angeles Times)
Photo: Bulent Kilic/ Getty Images

U.N. Security Council condemns Syria army attack in Houla | The Los Angeles Times

By Patrick J. McDonnell

The U.N. Security Council on Sunday condemned Syrian army artillery and tank barrages on a civilian neighborhood where 108 people, most of them women and children, were killed, suggesting in a carefully worded statement that government forces were largely responsible.

As international outrage escalated, some viewed the carnage as a possible turning point in the conflict. The government and opposition groups exchanged blame for the massacre Friday in the township of Houla in western Homs province.

The Security Council, meeting in an emergency session, said the “outrageous use of force against [the] civilian population” is a violation of a U.N. peace plan. It called on the government and its opponents to end violence, the U.N. said.

The statement was approved after a lengthy discussion withRussia, an ally of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Russia, which holds a veto and has thwarted any U.N.-backed international intervention in Syria, gave its assent to a statement that distanced the Syrian government from the killings of those in Houla who died from shooting at close range or as a result of “severe physical abuse.”

The U.N. said a new count indicated that 108 people were killed in Houla, including 49 children and 34 women. How many died from government shelling and how many perished from other causes was not clear.

FULL ARTICLE (The Los Angeles Times)

Photo: Bulent Kilic/ Getty Images

Arbour: NATO’s disturbing reliance on drones | Newsday 
By Louise Arbour
NATO leaders meeting in Chicago Sunday and Monday unveiled a program to expand the use of unmanned aerial vehicles — drones — to confront the security threats of the future and make better use of tighter budgets.
Used first for surveillance, and increasingly for strikes, drones have considerable operational attraction. But killing with these stealth weapons stretches legal boundaries to the breaking point, and alienates people in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, countries in which neither NATO nor the United States are actually fighting wars — unless we count the “war on terror” as having opened the entire world as a battlefield.
NATO’s attraction to drones is understandable. They are relatively cheap, can be deployed quickly in inhospitable terrain over vast distances, and help keep troops out of harm’s way. But this push-button solution to warfare poses very real risks to civilians, especially as targeting criteria deteriorate to the point where a special rapporteur to the United Nations has described them as a “vaguely defined license to kill.”
Louise Arbour is president and chief executive of the International Crisis Group, an independent organization committed to resolving deadly conflict.
FULL ARTICLE (Foreign Policy via Newsday) 
Photo: Enemenemu/ Wikimedia Commons

Arbour: NATO’s disturbing reliance on drones | Newsday 

By Louise Arbour

NATO leaders meeting in Chicago Sunday and Monday unveiled a program to expand the use of unmanned aerial vehicles — drones — to confront the security threats of the future and make better use of tighter budgets.

Used first for surveillance, and increasingly for strikes, drones have considerable operational attraction. But killing with these stealth weapons stretches legal boundaries to the breaking point, and alienates people in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, countries in which neither NATO nor the United States are actually fighting wars — unless we count the “war on terror” as having opened the entire world as a battlefield.

NATO’s attraction to drones is understandable. They are relatively cheap, can be deployed quickly in inhospitable terrain over vast distances, and help keep troops out of harm’s way. But this push-button solution to warfare poses very real risks to civilians, especially as targeting criteria deteriorate to the point where a special rapporteur to the United Nations has described them as a “vaguely defined license to kill.”

Louise Arbour is president and chief executive of the International Crisis Group, an independent organization committed to resolving deadly conflict.

FULL ARTICLE (Foreign Policy via Newsday) 

Photo: Enemenemu/ Wikimedia Commons

4 May
The New York Times | Bosnia Still Needs Fixing
IN the Bosnian city of Mostar, a beautiful Ottoman-era limestone bridge called the Stari Most arched over the Neretva River for 427 years, surviving earthquakes and two world wars. After a barrage of shelling in 1993, during the Bosnian civil war, the bridge collapsed. Citizens were stranded on opposite sides of the riverbank. Ethnic strain wasn’t the cause. It was the effect. Across the country, the war itself was dividing citizens into three ethno-nationalist clusters: Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks). Twenty years after the war began, and 17 years after the Dayton accords brought the fighting to an end, the bridge stands again, and a shallow peace prevails.
But now, the compromises we made to end the killing increasingly look inadequate, and it’s time to begin fixing them.
Mostar is still split: the west bank is primarily Croat, the east Bosniak. It is one city, but it has separate universities, postal services, health care systems and phone networks — and it can’t agree on how to elect a city council. Political institutions that were supposed to reconcile a divided society are ineffective; ethnic quotas at all levels of government breed nepotism; children study in classes divided according to their parentage; economic development has stagnated. And the populace feels angry and hopeless about the future.
Meanwhile, the international community has mostly turned its back on its own handiwork.
The 1995 Dayton agreement ended the worst bloodletting in Europe since World War II. The warring factions were brought together only with enormous pressures and incentives from the outside, including military strikes and the promise that other countries would continue to enforce the peace and extend economic assistance. The agreement provided for early elections and set up an unusual political structure, but it was imperfect. We knew that then.
Still, it was the best we could achieve, and, as the late Richard C. Holbrooke said at the time, the most important thing was to stop the killing.
In retrospect, we can see how some of Bosnia’s difficulties are our own fault. Early on, we had too simply labeled the violence as a clash of ethnic groups, roughly equal in their responsibilities to reconcile, when in fact they had been manipulated toward war primarily by Serbian nationalist leaders. We had ignored Bosnia’s experience before 1992, when its citizens from different ethnic groups were very often friends, colleagues, neighbors and spouses — and even during the war, when there were immeasurable acts of generosity across the ethnic divides. Had we outsiders realized that the violence was not inevitable, and had we been willing to name Serbs as the primary aggressors early in the war, NATOforces could have intervened much earlier and saved tens of thousands of lives.
But we came in late, and by the time we did, hatred and fighting had shaped the political and military balances we had to work with. That produced an agreement that institutionalized ethnicity as the deciding factor in political and social identity. It divided power and representation according to whether citizens were Bosniaks, Serbs or Croats, leaving little room to organize along other lines — for example, gender and level of urbanization.
Today, as set out at Dayton, Bosnia’s presidency is a triumvirate; each of the three members must be identified with one of the so-called constituent peoples. This slows down decision making and excludes minorities, as well as the large number of Bosnians who don’t identify with one of the major groups. In fact, two would-be presidential contenders, a Roma and a Jew, won a ruling in the European Court of Human Rights in 2009 that required constitutional revisions that would give neglected minorities equal opportunities to serve in government. Three years later, that reform is still being debated by Bosnian political leaders, who owe their positions to the status quo.
Dayton also divided the country itself into two separate statelets — a Bosniak-Croat federation and a Serb republic — governed by the same legislature and presidency. At the time, many Bosnian women’s groups, religious leaders, civil society activists and students warned that the arrangement wouldn’t work because the country historically had been integrated. But they weren’t at the negotiating table; only those with the power to fight or to lay down their weapons were invited.
In retrospect, perhaps we could have done better to engage politically unrepresented groups who craved stability, so that they could sit alongside those who knew how to fight.
The compromises at Dayton stopped the killing, but also helped perpetuate the ethnic chauvinism, fear and greed that had set it off. And now, the international community bears some responsibility to keep Bosnia from ever relapsing into violence. We also must help Bosnians fashion a better political system, one that promotes national unity, effective decision making and democratic participation.
Three moves would make a huge difference.
First, the American and European governments must help Bosnia change the Constitution we helped create.
Second, after the Constitution has been revised, the European Union should reward Bosnia by granting it membership. Serbia, after all, was given candidate status — a critical step toward full membership — in March, and Croatia is scheduled to become a full member next year. Europe should also extend more financial and technical assistance to implement the reforms needed to re-establish a pluralistic society and secure candidate status for Bosnia (which the European Union treats as a “potential candidate” for membership).
Third, NATO needs to offer the country a clear path for joining the alliance; it will have an opportunity to do so later this month when NATO holds a summit meeting in Chicago. Many Bosnians of all ethnicities look at membership in NATO as a guarantee of security, prosperity and stability. In addition, the military is the one Bosnian institution in which ethnic differences have mattered least; recently, when Serbian veterans’ benefits were cut, Bosniak veterans raised money to give to the people who once fought against them.
We also need to encourage and support the kind of moderate high-level and grass-roots leaders we overlooked during the negotiations 20 years ago. They are the real heroes of the war — and of the peace.
One such person is Kada Hotic, a leader of Bosnian Muslim survivors of the war. Only last June, she was finally able to bury three small bones — the only remains that could be identified of her son, who died in the infamous massacre of Muslims by Serbian fighters in 1995.
Yet Ms. Hotic offers: “Maybe one day we can close the story of war and move toward genuine reconciliation. Everyone has suffered. When those men killed my son, they killed themselves. I forgive them, and so I live.”
 Co-written by Wesley K. Clark, a retired Army general and former supreme allied commander of NATO in Europe, a board member at the International Crisis Group. 
ARTICLE (The New York Times) 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev/ Wikimedia Commons

The New York Times | Bosnia Still Needs Fixing

IN the Bosnian city of Mostar, a beautiful Ottoman-era limestone bridge called the Stari Most arched over the Neretva River for 427 years, surviving earthquakes and two world wars. After a barrage of shelling in 1993, during the Bosnian civil war, the bridge collapsed. Citizens were stranded on opposite sides of the riverbank. Ethnic strain wasn’t the cause. It was the effect. Across the country, the war itself was dividing citizens into three ethno-nationalist clusters: Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks). Twenty years after the war began, and 17 years after the Dayton accords brought the fighting to an end, the bridge stands again, and a shallow peace prevails.

But now, the compromises we made to end the killing increasingly look inadequate, and it’s time to begin fixing them.

Mostar is still split: the west bank is primarily Croat, the east Bosniak. It is one city, but it has separate universities, postal services, health care systems and phone networks — and it can’t agree on how to elect a city council. Political institutions that were supposed to reconcile a divided society are ineffective; ethnic quotas at all levels of government breed nepotism; children study in classes divided according to their parentage; economic development has stagnated. And the populace feels angry and hopeless about the future.

Meanwhile, the international community has mostly turned its back on its own handiwork.

The 1995 Dayton agreement ended the worst bloodletting in Europe since World War II. The warring factions were brought together only with enormous pressures and incentives from the outside, including military strikes and the promise that other countries would continue to enforce the peace and extend economic assistance. The agreement provided for early elections and set up an unusual political structure, but it was imperfect. We knew that then.

Still, it was the best we could achieve, and, as the late Richard C. Holbrooke said at the time, the most important thing was to stop the killing.

In retrospect, we can see how some of Bosnia’s difficulties are our own fault. Early on, we had too simply labeled the violence as a clash of ethnic groups, roughly equal in their responsibilities to reconcile, when in fact they had been manipulated toward war primarily by Serbian nationalist leaders. We had ignored Bosnia’s experience before 1992, when its citizens from different ethnic groups were very often friends, colleagues, neighbors and spouses — and even during the war, when there were immeasurable acts of generosity across the ethnic divides. Had we outsiders realized that the violence was not inevitable, and had we been willing to name Serbs as the primary aggressors early in the war, NATOforces could have intervened much earlier and saved tens of thousands of lives.

But we came in late, and by the time we did, hatred and fighting had shaped the political and military balances we had to work with. That produced an agreement that institutionalized ethnicity as the deciding factor in political and social identity. It divided power and representation according to whether citizens were Bosniaks, Serbs or Croats, leaving little room to organize along other lines — for example, gender and level of urbanization.

Today, as set out at Dayton, Bosnia’s presidency is a triumvirate; each of the three members must be identified with one of the so-called constituent peoples. This slows down decision making and excludes minorities, as well as the large number of Bosnians who don’t identify with one of the major groups. In fact, two would-be presidential contenders, a Roma and a Jew, won a ruling in the European Court of Human Rights in 2009 that required constitutional revisions that would give neglected minorities equal opportunities to serve in government. Three years later, that reform is still being debated by Bosnian political leaders, who owe their positions to the status quo.

Dayton also divided the country itself into two separate statelets — a Bosniak-Croat federation and a Serb republic — governed by the same legislature and presidency. At the time, many Bosnian women’s groups, religious leaders, civil society activists and students warned that the arrangement wouldn’t work because the country historically had been integrated. But they weren’t at the negotiating table; only those with the power to fight or to lay down their weapons were invited.

In retrospect, perhaps we could have done better to engage politically unrepresented groups who craved stability, so that they could sit alongside those who knew how to fight.

The compromises at Dayton stopped the killing, but also helped perpetuate the ethnic chauvinism, fear and greed that had set it off. And now, the international community bears some responsibility to keep Bosnia from ever relapsing into violence. We also must help Bosnians fashion a better political system, one that promotes national unity, effective decision making and democratic participation.

Three moves would make a huge difference.

First, the American and European governments must help Bosnia change the Constitution we helped create.

Second, after the Constitution has been revised, the European Union should reward Bosnia by granting it membership. Serbia, after all, was given candidate status — a critical step toward full membership — in March, and Croatia is scheduled to become a full member next year. Europe should also extend more financial and technical assistance to implement the reforms needed to re-establish a pluralistic society and secure candidate status for Bosnia (which the European Union treats as a “potential candidate” for membership).

Third, NATO needs to offer the country a clear path for joining the alliance; it will have an opportunity to do so later this month when NATO holds a summit meeting in Chicago. Many Bosnians of all ethnicities look at membership in NATO as a guarantee of security, prosperity and stability. In addition, the military is the one Bosnian institution in which ethnic differences have mattered least; recently, when Serbian veterans’ benefits were cut, Bosniak veterans raised money to give to the people who once fought against them.

We also need to encourage and support the kind of moderate high-level and grass-roots leaders we overlooked during the negotiations 20 years ago. They are the real heroes of the war — and of the peace.

One such person is Kada Hotic, a leader of Bosnian Muslim survivors of the war. Only last June, she was finally able to bury three small bones — the only remains that could be identified of her son, who died in the infamous massacre of Muslims by Serbian fighters in 1995.

Yet Ms. Hotic offers: “Maybe one day we can close the story of war and move toward genuine reconciliation. Everyone has suffered. When those men killed my son, they killed themselves. I forgive them, and so I live.”

 Co-written by Wesley K. Clark, a retired Army general and former supreme allied commander of NATO in Europe, a board member at the International Crisis Group. 

ARTICLE (The New York Times) 

Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev/ Wikimedia Commons

3 May
IRIN | Briefing: The right way forward for Afghan refugees?
As a meeting of representatives of the Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani governments and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) opened to discuss a new strategy for dealing with the most protracted refugee crisis in the world, NGOs working in Afghanistan raised a number of questions about the new approach. The so-called Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees, to support Voluntary Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration ad Assistance to Host Countries is an agreement between the three governments on a way forward for the 2.7 million Afghans registered as refugees in Iran and Pakistan; the estimated 2.4-3.4 million unregistered Afghans living in the two countries; and the nearly 6 million Afghans – one quarter of its population – who have returned from exile to very difficult circumstances. (See IRIN’s recent In-Depth look at the realities on the ground). The two-day meeting in Geneva, which started on 2 May, invited international stakeholders – donors, diplomats, international organizations, aid agencies and others – to endorse the new approach, at a cost of nearly US$2 billion, which seeks to improve conditions in communities of origin in Afghanistan to encourage returns while supporting communities which host Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, and providing Afghans in exile with skills training to help them upon their return to Afghanistan. One key component of the plan’s implementation is to improve up to 48 areas of high return in Afghanistan by creating “model villages” through coordinated community-based development: building schools, clinics, water canals, providing access to land and shelter, and creating livelihood opportunities. The goal is to improve the quality of life of returnees to the levels enjoyed by their local counterparts and to create an environment in which refugees are more willing to return to their areas of origin. 
FULL ARTICLE (IRIN)

IRIN | Briefing: The right way forward for Afghan refugees?

As a meeting of representatives of the Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani governments and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) opened to discuss a new strategy for dealing with the most protracted refugee crisis in the world, NGOs working in Afghanistan raised a number of questions about the new approach. 

The so-called Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees, to support Voluntary Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration ad Assistance to Host Countries is an agreement between the three governments on a way forward for the 2.7 million Afghans registered as refugees in Iran and Pakistan; the estimated 2.4-3.4 million unregistered Afghans living in the two countries; and the nearly 6 million Afghans – one quarter of its population – who have returned from exile to very difficult circumstances. (See IRIN’s recent In-Depth look at the realities on the ground). 

The two-day meeting in Geneva, which started on 2 May, invited international stakeholders – donors, diplomats, international organizations, aid agencies and others – to endorse the new approach, at a cost of nearly US$2 billion, which seeks to improve conditions in communities of origin in Afghanistan to encourage returns while supporting communities which host Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, and providing Afghans in exile with skills training to help them upon their return to Afghanistan. 

One key component of the plan’s implementation is to improve up to 48 areas of high return in Afghanistan by creating “model villages” through coordinated community-based development: building schools, clinics, water canals, providing access to land and shelter, and creating livelihood opportunities. The goal is to improve the quality of life of returnees to the levels enjoyed by their local counterparts and to create an environment in which refugees are more willing to return to their areas of origin. 

FULL ARTICLE (IRIN)