Showing posts tagged as "Benjamin Netanyahu"

Showing posts tagged Benjamin Netanyahu

1 Aug
Gaza tests US-Israel ‘special relationship’ | Gregg Carlstrom
Tel Aviv, Israel - The three-week-old Israeli offensive in Gaza has been turned into a full-fledged campaign to demilitarise the Strip, a war that for many Israelis involves not just Hamas but also John Kerry. The US secretary of state has become the target of unprecedented hostility over the past few days, since his failed attempt to broker a ceasefire and end a war that has killed more than 1,300 Palestinians, and 58 Israelis, most of them soldiers.
Kerry was publicly humiliated last week by the Israeli cabinet, which rejected his proposal hours before he was due to introduce it. Journalists picked up the campaign from there, dubbing him a “betrayer”, even an “alien”. The top diplomat of Israel’s main ally suddenly found himself labelled a friend of Palestinian faction Hamas.
"I’m not sure that we can trust Kerry in these negotiations," said Nir Shaul, sitting in a cafe off Rabin Square in central Tel Aviv, where there were few signs of the war raging an hour to the south. "Maybe it’s not him personally. Obama wants the war to end, he thinks Israel can reach an agreement with Hamas. It’s not realistic."
FULL ARTICLE (Al Jazeera)
Photo: U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv/flickr

Gaza tests US-Israel ‘special relationship’ | Gregg Carlstrom

Tel Aviv, Israel - The three-week-old Israeli offensive in Gaza has been turned into a full-fledged campaign to demilitarise the Strip, a war that for many Israelis involves not just Hamas but also John Kerry. The US secretary of state has become the target of unprecedented hostility over the past few days, since his failed attempt to broker a ceasefire and end a war that has killed more than 1,300 Palestinians, and 58 Israelis, most of them soldiers.

Kerry was publicly humiliated last week by the Israeli cabinet, which rejected his proposal hours before he was due to introduce it. Journalists picked up the campaign from there, dubbing him a “betrayer”, even an “alien”. The top diplomat of Israel’s main ally suddenly found himself labelled a friend of Palestinian faction Hamas.

"I’m not sure that we can trust Kerry in these negotiations," said Nir Shaul, sitting in a cafe off Rabin Square in central Tel Aviv, where there were few signs of the war raging an hour to the south. "Maybe it’s not him personally. Obama wants the war to end, he thinks Israel can reach an agreement with Hamas. It’s not realistic."

FULL ARTICLE (Al Jazeera)

Photo: U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv/flickr

31 Jul
Quest for Demilitarization of Gaza Is Seen Getting Netanyahu Only So Far | Jodi Rudoren
JERUSALEM — After years in which Israel’s prevailing approach to the Gaza Strip was a simple “quiet for quiet” demand, there is growing momentum around a new formula, “reconstruction for demilitarization.”
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is only the latest in a string of Israeli leaders who saw Gaza mainly as an irritant to be controlled with periodic crackdowns and as a roadblock to resolving the nation’s broader conflict with the Palestinians. But as Israel’s latest military bout with the Islamist Hamas faction, which dominates Gaza, has proved tougher than previous rounds, even Mr. Netanyahu has begun talking about Gaza’s need for “social and economic relief” from decade-old Israeli restrictions on trade and travel.
Mr. Netanyahu, who spent two months denouncing his Palestinian counterpart, President Mahmoud Abbas, for reconciling with Hamas, seems to be opening to the notion that a unity government led by Mr. Abbas might be the way to unlock Hamas’s hold on Gaza and quell violence. While these steps have won him some praise, analysts said they were still more tactical management than long-term strategy, and held little promise unless Mr. Netanyahu shifted positions on the larger Palestinian question.
FULL ARTICLE (New York Times)
Photo: Amir Farshad Ebrahimi/flickr

Quest for Demilitarization of Gaza Is Seen Getting Netanyahu Only So Far | Jodi Rudoren

JERUSALEM — After years in which Israel’s prevailing approach to the Gaza Strip was a simple “quiet for quiet” demand, there is growing momentum around a new formula, “reconstruction for demilitarization.”

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is only the latest in a string of Israeli leaders who saw Gaza mainly as an irritant to be controlled with periodic crackdowns and as a roadblock to resolving the nation’s broader conflict with the Palestinians. But as Israel’s latest military bout with the Islamist Hamas faction, which dominates Gaza, has proved tougher than previous rounds, even Mr. Netanyahu has begun talking about Gaza’s need for “social and economic relief” from decade-old Israeli restrictions on trade and travel.

Mr. Netanyahu, who spent two months denouncing his Palestinian counterpart, President Mahmoud Abbas, for reconciling with Hamas, seems to be opening to the notion that a unity government led by Mr. Abbas might be the way to unlock Hamas’s hold on Gaza and quell violence. While these steps have won him some praise, analysts said they were still more tactical management than long-term strategy, and held little promise unless Mr. Netanyahu shifted positions on the larger Palestinian question.

FULL ARTICLE (New York Times)

Photo: Amir Farshad Ebrahimi/flickr

30 Jul
The Man Who Haunts Israel | Michael Crowley
Khaled Mashaal lay dying in a hospital bed as poison flowed through his bloodstream, slowly shutting down his respiratory system. With a machine pumping air into his lungs, he had, at best, a few days to live. An antidote could save the Hamas leader’s life. But the only person who could provide it was the very man who had tried to kill him: Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.
As the clock ticked down over four days in late September 1997, with Mashaal unconscious and steadily deteriorating, Netanyahu faced an excruciating choice. The Mossad agents who had sprayed poison into the Palestinian’s ear on a street in Amman, Jordan — in retribution for a series of suicide attacks within Israel — had been captured while fleeing. Jordan’s King Hussein vowed to put the Israelis on trial if Mashaal expired. The agents would likely face execution if convicted. Desperate to avert an international crisis that would derail his efforts to broker peace deals between Israel and its Arab enemies, President Bill Clinton intervened, insisting that Netanyahu, then serving the first of his two tenures as Israel’s prime minister, provide the antidote. The Israeli leader grudgingly complied, even traveling to Amman to issue a personal apology to the King. Mashaal was revived, his stature forever enhanced as “the living martyr.” Instead of killing one of Israel’s most despised enemies, Netanyahu had resurrected him.
Fifteen years later, in December 2012, Mashaal, in his trademark western suit and trim salt-and-pepper beard, stepped out of a giant replica of an M75 rocket in the heart of Gaza City to address a crowd of cheering Palestinians. “We will never recognize the legitimacy of the Israeli occupation, and therefore there is no legitimacy for Israel, no matter how long it will take,” he thundered, as the green missile — among the models Hamas is currently firing into Israel by the thousands — towered several stories over his head. “We will free Jerusalem inch by inch, stone by stone. Israel has no right to be in Jerusalem.”
FULL ARTICLE (TIME)
Photo: Trango/Wikimedia Commons

The Man Who Haunts Israel | Michael Crowley

Khaled Mashaal lay dying in a hospital bed as poison flowed through his bloodstream, slowly shutting down his respiratory system. With a machine pumping air into his lungs, he had, at best, a few days to live. An antidote could save the Hamas leader’s life. But the only person who could provide it was the very man who had tried to kill him: Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.

As the clock ticked down over four days in late September 1997, with Mashaal unconscious and steadily deteriorating, Netanyahu faced an excruciating choice. The Mossad agents who had sprayed poison into the Palestinian’s ear on a street in Amman, Jordan — in retribution for a series of suicide attacks within Israel — had been captured while fleeing. Jordan’s King Hussein vowed to put the Israelis on trial if Mashaal expired. The agents would likely face execution if convicted. Desperate to avert an international crisis that would derail his efforts to broker peace deals between Israel and its Arab enemies, President Bill Clinton intervened, insisting that Netanyahu, then serving the first of his two tenures as Israel’s prime minister, provide the antidote. The Israeli leader grudgingly complied, even traveling to Amman to issue a personal apology to the King. Mashaal was revived, his stature forever enhanced as “the living martyr.” Instead of killing one of Israel’s most despised enemies, Netanyahu had resurrected him.

Fifteen years later, in December 2012, Mashaal, in his trademark western suit and trim salt-and-pepper beard, stepped out of a giant replica of an M75 rocket in the heart of Gaza City to address a crowd of cheering Palestinians. “We will never recognize the legitimacy of the Israeli occupation, and therefore there is no legitimacy for Israel, no matter how long it will take,” he thundered, as the green missile — among the models Hamas is currently firing into Israel by the thousands — towered several stories over his head. “We will free Jerusalem inch by inch, stone by stone. Israel has no right to be in Jerusalem.”

FULL ARTICLE (TIME)

Photo: Trango/Wikimedia Commons

29 Jul
American aid to Israel doesn’t seem to buy any leverage. Why? | Zack Beauchamp 
It’s been a bad year for US diplomacy in Israel-Palestine. Both major pushes by Secretary of State John Kerry to negotiate some kind of deal — first the Palestinian Authority-Israel peace framework negotiations in mid-2014, then a Hamas-Israel ceasefire this weekend — have failed. About 24 hours after Kerry’s proposed cease fire fell apart, Kerry was still defending his approach from fierce Israeli and Palestinian criticism.
The US, it turns out, does not have quite as much ability to nudge its Israeli allies as you might think. The United States failed to get a permanent settlement freeze in 2009, couldn’t get Israelis to agree to a framework for peace negotiations the Palestinians would accept (and vice versa), and hasn’t made any headway on the “immediate ceasefire" in Gaza that President Obama has repeatedly called for. This all seems strange on the surface: the US is a superpower, provides about $3 billion in aid to Israel every year, and uses its veto to protect Israel at the United Nations when no one else will. So why hasn’t the US been able to force Israel to see things its way? Why does it appear to have so little leverage?
FULL ARTICLE (VOX)
Photo: Matty Ster/flickr

American aid to Israel doesn’t seem to buy any leverage. Why? | Zack Beauchamp 

It’s been a bad year for US diplomacy in Israel-Palestine. Both major pushes by Secretary of State John Kerry to negotiate some kind of deal — first the Palestinian Authority-Israel peace framework negotiations in mid-2014, then a Hamas-Israel ceasefire this weekend — have failed. About 24 hours after Kerry’s proposed cease fire fell apart, Kerry was still defending his approach from fierce Israeli and Palestinian criticism.

The US, it turns out, does not have quite as much ability to nudge its Israeli allies as you might think. The United States failed to get a permanent settlement freeze in 2009, couldn’t get Israelis to agree to a framework for peace negotiations the Palestinians would accept (and vice versa), and hasn’t made any headway on the “immediate ceasefire" in Gaza that President Obama has repeatedly called for. This all seems strange on the surface: the US is a superpower, provides about $3 billion in aid to Israel every year, and uses its veto to protect Israel at the United Nations when no one else will. So why hasn’t the US been able to force Israel to see things its way? Why does it appear to have so little leverage?

FULL ARTICLE (VOX)

Photo: Matty Ster/flickr

18 Jul
How the West Chose War in Gaza | Nathan Thrall
Nathan Thrall is a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group covering Gaza, Israel, Jordan and the West Bank.
As Hamas fires rockets at Israeli cities and Israel follows up its extensive airstrikes with a ground operation in the Gaza Strip, the most immediate cause of this latest war has been ignored: Israel and much of the international community placed a prohibitive set of obstacles in the way of the Palestinian “national consensus” government that was formed in early June.
That government was created largely because of Hamas’s desperation and isolation. The group’s alliance with Syria and Iran was in shambles. Its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt became a liability after a July 2013 coup replaced an ally, President Mohamed Morsi, with a bitter adversary, Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Hamas’s coffers dried up as General Sisi closed the tunnels that had brought to Gaza the goods and tax revenues on which it depended.
Seeing a region swept by popular protests against leaders who couldn’t provide for their citizens’ basic needs, Hamas opted to give up official control of Gaza rather than risk being overthrown. Despite having won the last elections, in 2006, Hamas decided to transfer formal authority to the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah. That decision led to a reconciliation agreement between Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization, on terms set almost entirely by the P.L.O. chairman and Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas.
Israel immediately sought to undermine the reconciliation agreement by preventing Hamas leaders and Gaza residents from obtaining the two most essential benefits of the deal: the payment of salaries to 43,000 civil servants who worked for the Hamas government and continue to administer Gaza under the new one, and the easing of the suffocating border closures imposed by Israel and Egypt that bar most Gazans’ passage to the outside world.
Yet, in many ways, the reconciliation government could have served Israel’s interests. It offered Hamas’s political adversaries a foothold in Gaza; it was formed without a single Hamas member; it retained the same Ramallah-based prime minister, deputy prime ministers, finance minister and foreign minister; and, most important, it pledged to comply with the three conditions for Western aid long demanded by America and its European allies: nonviolence, adherence to past agreements and recognition of Israel.
Israel strongly opposed American recognition of the new government, however, and sought to isolate it internationally, seeing any small step toward Palestinian unity as a threat. Israel’s security establishment objects to the strengthening of West Bank-Gaza ties, lest Hamas raise its head in the West Bank. And Israelis who oppose a two-state solution understand that a unified Palestinian leadership is a prerequisite for any lasting peace.
Still, despite its opposition to the reconciliation agreement, Israel continued to transfer the tax revenues it collects on the Palestinian Authority’s behalf, and to work closely with the new government, especially on security cooperation.
But the key issues of paying Gaza’s civil servants and opening the border with Egypt were left to fester. The new government’s ostensible supporters, especially the United States and Europe, could have pushed Egypt to ease border restrictions, thereby demonstrating to Gazans that Hamas rule had been the cause of their isolation and impoverishment. But they did not.
Instead, after Hamas transferred authority to a government of pro-Western technocrats, life in Gaza became worse.
Qatar had offered to pay Gaza’s 43,000 civil servants, and America and Europe could have helped facilitate that. But Washington warned that American law prohibited any entity delivering payment to even one of those employees — many thousands of whom are not members of Hamas but all of whom are considered by American law to have received material support from a terrorist organization.
When a United Nations envoy offered to resolve this crisis by delivering the salaries through the United Nations, so as to exclude all parties from legal liability, the Obama administration did not assist. Instead, it stood by as Israel’s foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, called for the envoy’s expulsion on the grounds that he was “trying to funnel money” to Hamas.
Hamas is now seeking through violence what it couldn’t obtain through a peaceful handover of responsibilities. Israel is pursuing a return to the status quo ante, when Gaza had electricity for barely eight hours a day, water was undrinkable, sewage was dumped in the sea, fuel shortages caused sanitation plants to shut down and waste sometimes floated in the streets. Patients needing medical care couldn’t reach Egyptian hospitals, and Gazans paid $3,000 bribes for a chance to exit when Egypt chose to open the border crossing.
For many Gazans, and not just Hamas supporters, it’s worth risking more bombardment and now the ground incursion, for a chance to change that unacceptable status quo. A cease-fire that fails to resolve the salary crisis and open Gaza’s border with Egypt will not last. It is unsustainable for Gaza to remain cut off from the world and administered by employees working without pay. A more generous cease-fire, though politically difficult for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, would be more durable.
The current escalation in Gaza is a direct result of the choice by Israel and the West to obstruct the implementation of the April 2014 Palestinian reconciliation agreement. The road out of the crisis is a reversal of that policy.
ORIGINAL COMMENTARY (New York Times)
Photo: Israel Defense Forces/flickr

How the West Chose War in Gaza | Nathan Thrall

Nathan Thrall is a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group covering Gaza, Israel, Jordan and the West Bank.

As Hamas fires rockets at Israeli cities and Israel follows up its extensive airstrikes with a ground operation in the Gaza Strip, the most immediate cause of this latest war has been ignored: Israel and much of the international community placed a prohibitive set of obstacles in the way of the Palestinian “national consensus” government that was formed in early June.

That government was created largely because of Hamas’s desperation and isolation. The group’s alliance with Syria and Iran was in shambles. Its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt became a liability after a July 2013 coup replaced an ally, President Mohamed Morsi, with a bitter adversary, Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Hamas’s coffers dried up as General Sisi closed the tunnels that had brought to Gaza the goods and tax revenues on which it depended.

Seeing a region swept by popular protests against leaders who couldn’t provide for their citizens’ basic needs, Hamas opted to give up official control of Gaza rather than risk being overthrown. Despite having won the last elections, in 2006, Hamas decided to transfer formal authority to the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah. That decision led to a reconciliation agreement between Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization, on terms set almost entirely by the P.L.O. chairman and Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas.

Israel immediately sought to undermine the reconciliation agreement by preventing Hamas leaders and Gaza residents from obtaining the two most essential benefits of the deal: the payment of salaries to 43,000 civil servants who worked for the Hamas government and continue to administer Gaza under the new one, and the easing of the suffocating border closures imposed by Israel and Egypt that bar most Gazans’ passage to the outside world.

Yet, in many ways, the reconciliation government could have served Israel’s interests. It offered Hamas’s political adversaries a foothold in Gaza; it was formed without a single Hamas member; it retained the same Ramallah-based prime minister, deputy prime ministers, finance minister and foreign minister; and, most important, it pledged to comply with the three conditions for Western aid long demanded by America and its European allies: nonviolence, adherence to past agreements and recognition of Israel.

Israel strongly opposed American recognition of the new government, however, and sought to isolate it internationally, seeing any small step toward Palestinian unity as a threat. Israel’s security establishment objects to the strengthening of West Bank-Gaza ties, lest Hamas raise its head in the West Bank. And Israelis who oppose a two-state solution understand that a unified Palestinian leadership is a prerequisite for any lasting peace.

Still, despite its opposition to the reconciliation agreement, Israel continued to transfer the tax revenues it collects on the Palestinian Authority’s behalf, and to work closely with the new government, especially on security cooperation.

But the key issues of paying Gaza’s civil servants and opening the border with Egypt were left to fester. The new government’s ostensible supporters, especially the United States and Europe, could have pushed Egypt to ease border restrictions, thereby demonstrating to Gazans that Hamas rule had been the cause of their isolation and impoverishment. But they did not.

Instead, after Hamas transferred authority to a government of pro-Western technocrats, life in Gaza became worse.

Qatar had offered to pay Gaza’s 43,000 civil servants, and America and Europe could have helped facilitate that. But Washington warned that American law prohibited any entity delivering payment to even one of those employees — many thousands of whom are not members of Hamas but all of whom are considered by American law to have received material support from a terrorist organization.

When a United Nations envoy offered to resolve this crisis by delivering the salaries through the United Nations, so as to exclude all parties from legal liability, the Obama administration did not assist. Instead, it stood by as Israel’s foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, called for the envoy’s expulsion on the grounds that he was “trying to funnel money” to Hamas.

Hamas is now seeking through violence what it couldn’t obtain through a peaceful handover of responsibilities. Israel is pursuing a return to the status quo ante, when Gaza had electricity for barely eight hours a day, water was undrinkable, sewage was dumped in the sea, fuel shortages caused sanitation plants to shut down and waste sometimes floated in the streets. Patients needing medical care couldn’t reach Egyptian hospitals, and Gazans paid $3,000 bribes for a chance to exit when Egypt chose to open the border crossing.

For many Gazans, and not just Hamas supporters, it’s worth risking more bombardment and now the ground incursion, for a chance to change that unacceptable status quo. A cease-fire that fails to resolve the salary crisis and open Gaza’s border with Egypt will not last. It is unsustainable for Gaza to remain cut off from the world and administered by employees working without pay. A more generous cease-fire, though politically difficult for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, would be more durable.

The current escalation in Gaza is a direct result of the choice by Israel and the West to obstruct the implementation of the April 2014 Palestinian reconciliation agreement. The road out of the crisis is a reversal of that policy.

ORIGINAL COMMENTARY (New York Times)

Photo: Israel Defense Forces/flickr

14 Jul
Gaza and Israel: New Obstacles, New Solutions
Jerusalem/Gaza City/Brussels  |   14 Jul 2014
To break the violent impasse, Israel must change its policy toward Hamas and work toward a lasting ceasefire, recognising how much its own stability depends on the stability of Gaza.
After rounds of pyrrhic victories and weak ceasefires, Israel and Hamas are again locked in combat, with at least 168 Palestinian deaths, mainly civilian, in less than a week and Israeli civilians seeking shelter from rocket salvos. The policy of isolating Hamas has proved counterproductive and made reviving Gaza not just a humanitarian necessity but a requirement for calm and stability. In its latest briefing, Gaza and Israel: New Obstacles, New Solutions, the International Crisis Group examines scenarios that could result from the fighting and outlines the conditions necessary to ensure a more stable cessation of violence.
The report’s major findings and recommendations are:
Anchoring a ceasefire in a political framework is the only way to prevent it from unravelling as fast as previous ones. No lasting arrangement can be reached without Egypt. Despite Hamas’s poor relations with Egypt, the sooner Cairo accelerates its role, the sooner the conflict can end. 
Israel should give the reconciliation agreement signed in April by Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) a chance to work. If implemented, it offers the best chance of alleviating Gaza’s misery and therefore reducing Hamas’s incentives to fight. The U.S., along with the European Union and regional allies, should encourage the Palestinian Authority (PA) to return to the Gaza Strip and assume the responsibilities of governance. 
Hamas should ensure, in tacit cooperation with the new government, acceptance and maintenance of the ceasefire by all Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip. 
The PA should help arrange for payment of the roughly 43,000 Gaza government employees hired under Hamas who are not receiving their salaries. PA security forces should be deployed at border crossings to facilitate the movement of goods to Gaza and of people to Israel and Egypt. 
The U.S. should continue to support the reconciliation government, and Israel should cooperate with it to resolve Gaza’s most pressing problems, including energy, water and sanitation.
“Given the choice between being slowly squeezed to death and going down fighting, and that between waiting for Israel to eliminate the stockpiles on the ground or shooting them into Israel, Hamas will take the latter both times. Knowing that it cannot best Israel militarily, it has opted for a psychological war of attrition”, says Nathan Thrall, Middle East Senior Analyst.
“Prime Minister Netanyahu is caught between Realpolitik and electoral considerations. Realpolitik dictates a controlled escalation followed by a renewed ceasefire, but any concession he makes to Hamas will be used against him by competitors to his right, who advocate a more extensive campaign and more ambitious objectives in Gaza”, says Ofer Zalzberg, Senior Analyst for Israel/Palestine.
“The policy of trying to topple or weaken Hamas was misguided when designed and remains so”, says Robert Blecher, Middle East and North Africa Acting Program Director. “The sooner it is reversed, the sooner Gazans can resume something like a normal life, Israelis can come out of bomb shelters and Palestinians can repair their internal affairs and prepare to enter a reformed peace process”.
FULL REPORT

Gaza and Israel: New Obstacles, New Solutions

Jerusalem/Gaza City/Brussels  |   14 Jul 2014

To break the violent impasse, Israel must change its policy toward Hamas and work toward a lasting ceasefire, recognising how much its own stability depends on the stability of Gaza.

After rounds of pyrrhic victories and weak ceasefires, Israel and Hamas are again locked in combat, with at least 168 Palestinian deaths, mainly civilian, in less than a week and Israeli civilians seeking shelter from rocket salvos. The policy of isolating Hamas has proved counterproductive and made reviving Gaza not just a humanitarian necessity but a requirement for calm and stability. In its latest briefing, Gaza and Israel: New Obstacles, New Solutions, the International Crisis Group examines scenarios that could result from the fighting and outlines the conditions necessary to ensure a more stable cessation of violence.

The report’s major findings and recommendations are:

  • Anchoring a ceasefire in a political framework is the only way to prevent it from unravelling as fast as previous ones. No lasting arrangement can be reached without Egypt. Despite Hamas’s poor relations with Egypt, the sooner Cairo accelerates its role, the sooner the conflict can end. 
  • Israel should give the reconciliation agreement signed in April by Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) a chance to work. If implemented, it offers the best chance of alleviating Gaza’s misery and therefore reducing Hamas’s incentives to fight. The U.S., along with the European Union and regional allies, should encourage the Palestinian Authority (PA) to return to the Gaza Strip and assume the responsibilities of governance. 
  • Hamas should ensure, in tacit cooperation with the new government, acceptance and maintenance of the ceasefire by all Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip. 
  • The PA should help arrange for payment of the roughly 43,000 Gaza government employees hired under Hamas who are not receiving their salaries. PA security forces should be deployed at border crossings to facilitate the movement of goods to Gaza and of people to Israel and Egypt. 
  • The U.S. should continue to support the reconciliation government, and Israel should cooperate with it to resolve Gaza’s most pressing problems, including energy, water and sanitation.

“Given the choice between being slowly squeezed to death and going down fighting, and that between waiting for Israel to eliminate the stockpiles on the ground or shooting them into Israel, Hamas will take the latter both times. Knowing that it cannot best Israel militarily, it has opted for a psychological war of attrition”, says Nathan Thrall, Middle East Senior Analyst.

“Prime Minister Netanyahu is caught between Realpolitik and electoral considerations. Realpolitik dictates a controlled escalation followed by a renewed ceasefire, but any concession he makes to Hamas will be used against him by competitors to his right, who advocate a more extensive campaign and more ambitious objectives in Gaza”, says Ofer Zalzberg, Senior Analyst for Israel/Palestine.

“The policy of trying to topple or weaken Hamas was misguided when designed and remains so”, says Robert Blecher, Middle East and North Africa Acting Program Director. “The sooner it is reversed, the sooner Gazans can resume something like a normal life, Israelis can come out of bomb shelters and Palestinians can repair their internal affairs and prepare to enter a reformed peace process”.

FULL REPORT

7 Jul
Israel’s Hamas Challenge: The Third Way | Ofer Zalzberg
Ofer Zalzberg is the senior Middle East analyst of the International Crisis Group’s Arab-Israeli project.
The kidnapping and murder of three Israeli yeshiva students — and the extensive Israeli military campaign against Hamas, members of which Israel presumes to have perpetrated the act – illustrate the urgency of revisiting Israel’s policy options toward the Islamist group. Largely ignored since the last outbreak of violence, the issue is today again on the public agenda. How should Israel deal with Hamas?
The three principles set out by the Quartet (the EU, US, UN and Russia) – that Hamas renounce violence, recognize Israel, and accept previous PLO agreements – are unlikely to prompt a reexamination within Hamas — not only because they are theologically unacceptable, but because the Islamist group believes the PLO’s acting in accordance with them failed to deliver anything meaningful to Palestinians. Hamas’s own proposal of a decades-long term hudna is considered a non-starter by Israel; not only would it not end the conflict, but it is conditioned on Israel accepting an array of impossible demands: Palestinian statehood based on the 1967 borders and a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, without any land swaps and with unqualified choice for all Palestinian refugees whether to return to their original homes or villages.
PM Netanyahu’s most likely course of action is to seek a respite from violence through what he calls “quiet for quiet”. More ambitiously, there are two alternative approaches, advanced by members of his cabinet, that would seek to fundamentally transform the conflict with Hamas. The first, advocated by FM Avigdor Lieberman and Economy Minister Naftali Bennett — dubbed “Let the IDF Win” — is for the Israeli army to retake Gaza for a sustained period in order to “dismantle the terrorist infrastructure”. This would involve directly confronting Hamas militants, arresting the movement’s leadership, confiscating weapons, eliminating production capacities, closing down its associations and charities and either enthroning another Palestinian ruler or continuing direct Israeli military rule. PM Netanyahu and the Israeli defense establishment believe the costs of this option are too high.
The second approach, supported by self-defined centrists like Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, also in effect envisions Hamas’s ultimate disappearance from Palestinian life, by cooperating with those she identifies as moderates – such as Palestinian Authority’s President Mahmoud Abbas — while striking Hamas. The Palestinian public would then, the argument goes, come to see that the moderates as the only ones who can deliver. But to date, they have delivered little more than limited material-economic benefits, far less than necessary to defeat Hamas. What would be required to see whether this strategy could succeed are gains truly appreciated by their society – viable Palestinian statehood in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem – which would require that the Israeli government give up much more than it is willing to, certainly in advance of a final status agreement. Nor are Hamas’s roots and infrastructure – which are not physical or organizational but societal, religious and emotional – likely to disappear from a conservative society.
A third approach is needed. While protecting Israel’s civilian population militarily, Israel should try to catalyze Hamas’s ultimate transformation to an unarmed political party in a Palestinian state. For theological reasons, even in a best case scenario Hamas will remain at arm’s length from a final status agreement. So it should be brought to accept, post-facto, what others will have accepted for it explicitly and de jure.
This strategy could include the following three components.
- Israel could encourage Palestinians – for instance, by welcoming PLO reform – to establish a legal ratification mechanism for a final status agreement that would commit Hamas to abide by the majority’s decision even where it is not to the movement’s liking (for example, even should, hypothetically, the State of Palestine accepts the Quartet principles or recognizes Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people).
- Israel could reply positively to the Arab Peace Initiative, possibly with minor and negotiable reservations, to lay the basis for a peace agreement supported by Hamas’s sponsors (e.g. Qatar and Turkey), strategically critical neighbors (Egypt) and countries representing an important Islamic voice (e.g. Saudi Arabia) that Hamas would find hard to brush away.
- In the Islamic arena, Israel could promote interreligious dialogue and cooperation with Islamic groups that, unlike Hamas, do not consider Israel’s existence a violation of Islamic law or principles. The southern branch of Israel’s own Islamic movement, members of which serve in Knesset, could perhaps be a relevant interlocutor. Its founder, Sheikh Nimr Darwish, supports the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative. Rather than blocking all Islamist factions from activity on the Holy Esplanade, might publicly or tacitly granting a consultative role there for the southern branch lead to positive cooperation with Israel? Could Jordan’s or Egypt’s Grand Mufti be a relevant interlocutor on the esplanade’s management or on other issues? Are there potential partners in the non-Arab Islamic world? Palestinians, including the many varieties of Islamists among them, will need to establish their national movement’s positions toward Israel, but Israel could help shape this debate by encouraging engagement with Muslims not theologically opposed to its existence.
Taken together – ultimately combined, of course, with progress in negotiations toward a Palestinian state — these and other steps could help transform Hamas within a (likely non-militarized) State of Palestine, which, after its establishment, would collect and store Hamas’s weapons in internationally monitored depots within or outside its territory.
Netanyahu’s government is likely to muddle through, and eventually fight another round, rather than pursue any of these three options. But now is the time for Israelis to rethink. Hamas, with its regional position greatly weakened, might be open to considering new paths. With violence likely to increase, the recent kidnappings and murders should prod all seeking the well being of Israelis and Palestinians to re-visit long held assumptions in order to head off future tragedies .
ORIGINAL ARTICLE (Times of Israel)
Photo: Synne Tonidas/flickr

Israel’s Hamas Challenge: The Third Way | Ofer Zalzberg

Ofer Zalzberg is the senior Middle East analyst of the International Crisis Group’s Arab-Israeli project.

The kidnapping and murder of three Israeli yeshiva students — and the extensive Israeli military campaign against Hamas, members of which Israel presumes to have perpetrated the act – illustrate the urgency of revisiting Israel’s policy options toward the Islamist group. Largely ignored since the last outbreak of violence, the issue is today again on the public agenda. How should Israel deal with Hamas?

The three principles set out by the Quartet (the EU, US, UN and Russia) – that Hamas renounce violence, recognize Israel, and accept previous PLO agreements – are unlikely to prompt a reexamination within Hamas — not only because they are theologically unacceptable, but because the Islamist group believes the PLO’s acting in accordance with them failed to deliver anything meaningful to Palestinians. Hamas’s own proposal of a decades-long term hudna is considered a non-starter by Israel; not only would it not end the conflict, but it is conditioned on Israel accepting an array of impossible demands: Palestinian statehood based on the 1967 borders and a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, without any land swaps and with unqualified choice for all Palestinian refugees whether to return to their original homes or villages.

PM Netanyahu’s most likely course of action is to seek a respite from violence through what he calls “quiet for quiet”. More ambitiously, there are two alternative approaches, advanced by members of his cabinet, that would seek to fundamentally transform the conflict with Hamas. The first, advocated by FM Avigdor Lieberman and Economy Minister Naftali Bennett — dubbed “Let the IDF Win” — is for the Israeli army to retake Gaza for a sustained period in order to “dismantle the terrorist infrastructure”. This would involve directly confronting Hamas militants, arresting the movement’s leadership, confiscating weapons, eliminating production capacities, closing down its associations and charities and either enthroning another Palestinian ruler or continuing direct Israeli military rule. PM Netanyahu and the Israeli defense establishment believe the costs of this option are too high.

The second approach, supported by self-defined centrists like Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, also in effect envisions Hamas’s ultimate disappearance from Palestinian life, by cooperating with those she identifies as moderates – such as Palestinian Authority’s President Mahmoud Abbas — while striking Hamas. The Palestinian public would then, the argument goes, come to see that the moderates as the only ones who can deliver. But to date, they have delivered little more than limited material-economic benefits, far less than necessary to defeat Hamas. What would be required to see whether this strategy could succeed are gains truly appreciated by their society – viable Palestinian statehood in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem – which would require that the Israeli government give up much more than it is willing to, certainly in advance of a final status agreement. Nor are Hamas’s roots and infrastructure – which are not physical or organizational but societal, religious and emotional – likely to disappear from a conservative society.

A third approach is needed. While protecting Israel’s civilian population militarily, Israel should try to catalyze Hamas’s ultimate transformation to an unarmed political party in a Palestinian state. For theological reasons, even in a best case scenario Hamas will remain at arm’s length from a final status agreement. So it should be brought to accept, post-facto, what others will have accepted for it explicitly and de jure.

This strategy could include the following three components.

- Israel could encourage Palestinians – for instance, by welcoming PLO reform – to establish a legal ratification mechanism for a final status agreement that would commit Hamas to abide by the majority’s decision even where it is not to the movement’s liking (for example, even should, hypothetically, the State of Palestine accepts the Quartet principles or recognizes Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people).

- Israel could reply positively to the Arab Peace Initiative, possibly with minor and negotiable reservations, to lay the basis for a peace agreement supported by Hamas’s sponsors (e.g. Qatar and Turkey), strategically critical neighbors (Egypt) and countries representing an important Islamic voice (e.g. Saudi Arabia) that Hamas would find hard to brush away.

- In the Islamic arena, Israel could promote interreligious dialogue and cooperation with Islamic groups that, unlike Hamas, do not consider Israel’s existence a violation of Islamic law or principles. The southern branch of Israel’s own Islamic movement, members of which serve in Knesset, could perhaps be a relevant interlocutor. Its founder, Sheikh Nimr Darwish, supports the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative. Rather than blocking all Islamist factions from activity on the Holy Esplanade, might publicly or tacitly granting a consultative role there for the southern branch lead to positive cooperation with Israel? Could Jordan’s or Egypt’s Grand Mufti be a relevant interlocutor on the esplanade’s management or on other issues? Are there potential partners in the non-Arab Islamic world? Palestinians, including the many varieties of Islamists among them, will need to establish their national movement’s positions toward Israel, but Israel could help shape this debate by encouraging engagement with Muslims not theologically opposed to its existence.

Taken together – ultimately combined, of course, with progress in negotiations toward a Palestinian state — these and other steps could help transform Hamas within a (likely non-militarized) State of Palestine, which, after its establishment, would collect and store Hamas’s weapons in internationally monitored depots within or outside its territory.

Netanyahu’s government is likely to muddle through, and eventually fight another round, rather than pursue any of these three options. But now is the time for Israelis to rethink. Hamas, with its regional position greatly weakened, might be open to considering new paths. With violence likely to increase, the recent kidnappings and murders should prod all seeking the well being of Israelis and Palestinians to re-visit long held assumptions in order to head off future tragedies .

ORIGINAL ARTICLE (Times of Israel)

Photo: Synne Tonidas/flickr

18 Feb
Palestinians in Gaza Strip resent being left out of peace talks | Kate Linthicum
Like many Palestinians, Marwan Hissi has closely followed reports of peace negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.
An unemployed father of five living in a refugee community in the Gaza Strip, Hissi says he has a question for American negotiators leading the talks: “Where’s Hamas?”
The Islamic militant movement, which seized control of Gaza in 2007, has been excluded from the process as U.S. officials work out a preliminary agreement on key issues in the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel, the United States and the European Union refuse to engage with Hamas, which does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and which they consider a terrorist group.
While all eyes are trained on Netanyahu and Abbas as U.S. Secretary of State John F. Kerry prepares to present a deal, the issue of Hamas, which could make or break the implementation of any agreement, looms uncomfortably in the background.
FULL ARTICLE (L.A. Times)
Photo: J McDowell/flickr

Palestinians in Gaza Strip resent being left out of peace talks | Kate Linthicum

Like many Palestinians, Marwan Hissi has closely followed reports of peace negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

An unemployed father of five living in a refugee community in the Gaza Strip, Hissi says he has a question for American negotiators leading the talks: “Where’s Hamas?”

The Islamic militant movement, which seized control of Gaza in 2007, has been excluded from the process as U.S. officials work out a preliminary agreement on key issues in the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel, the United States and the European Union refuse to engage with Hamas, which does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and which they consider a terrorist group.

While all eyes are trained on Netanyahu and Abbas as U.S. Secretary of State John F. Kerry prepares to present a deal, the issue of Hamas, which could make or break the implementation of any agreement, looms uncomfortably in the background.

FULL ARTICLE (L.A. Times)

Photo: J McDowell/flickr

12 Feb
Jerusalem in the Here and Now | Foreign Policy
By Robert Blecher
The brouhaha over Israel’s recent settlement announcements faded as suddenly as it emerged. After the United Nations General Assembly vote on November 29, 2012 that granted Palestine non-member observer status, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu authorized an aggressive push in and around East Jerusalem. Construction plans, some of which already were on the fast track, were further accelerated and thousands of new housing units were approved, both to deter the Palestinian leadership from taking further steps in the international arena and as an unsuccessful election gambit to shore up his right flank. Within weeks, the bureaucracy reverted to a plodding pace, partly because the brouhaha had served its purpose, partly because of the quick and relatively forceful international response.
FULL ARTICLE (Foreign Policy)
Photo: Aslan Media/Flickr

Jerusalem in the Here and Now | Foreign Policy

By Robert Blecher

The brouhaha over Israel’s recent settlement announcements faded as suddenly as it emerged. After the United Nations General Assembly vote on November 29, 2012 that granted Palestine non-member observer status, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu authorized an aggressive push in and around East Jerusalem. Construction plans, some of which already were on the fast track, were further accelerated and thousands of new housing units were approved, both to deter the Palestinian leadership from taking further steps in the international arena and as an unsuccessful election gambit to shore up his right flank. Within weeks, the bureaucracy reverted to a plodding pace, partly because the brouhaha had served its purpose, partly because of the quick and relatively forceful international response.

FULL ARTICLE (Foreign Policy)

Photo: Aslan Media/Flickr

26 Jun
Putin Turns on the Charm in Israel | The National
By: Hugh Naylor
Unveiling a memorial to Soviet soldiers of the Second World War in Israel yesterday, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, began a tour that seems designed to spin his country’s regional policies.
Moscow has received a public relations battering for its support of Syria’s president, Bashar Al Assad, as his forces try to crush a rebellion that has claimed as estimated 14,000 lives, most of them civilians, according to rights groups and activists.
Israel and its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, are also frustrated with Russia’s ties to Iran. Mr Netanyahu was expected to ask Mr Putin to put pressure on Tehran over its suspected nuclear weapons programme.
FULL ARTICLE (The National)
Photo: AFP

Putin Turns on the Charm in Israel | The National

By: Hugh Naylor

Unveiling a memorial to Soviet soldiers of the Second World War in Israel yesterday, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, began a tour that seems designed to spin his country’s regional policies.

Moscow has received a public relations battering for its support of Syria’s president, Bashar Al Assad, as his forces try to crush a rebellion that has claimed as estimated 14,000 lives, most of them civilians, according to rights groups and activists.

Israel and its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, are also frustrated with Russia’s ties to Iran. Mr Netanyahu was expected to ask Mr Putin to put pressure on Tehran over its suspected nuclear weapons programme.

FULL ARTICLE (The National)

Photo: AFP