International Crisis Group

May 21

“Even with so-called “personality” strikes in which the individual has been targeted based on evidence of identity, accurate assessments of collateral damage are impossible.” — from Crisis Group’s recent report, Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan

“Nine years after the first U.S. drone strike in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 2004, the U.S. refuses to officially acknowledge the CIA-run program, while Pakistan denies consenting to it.” — from Crisis Group’s recent report, Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan

Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan Islamabad/Washington/Brussels  |   21 May 2013 Drone strikes alone will not eliminate the jihadi threat in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Extension of Pakistani law and full constitutional rights to the region is the only long-term solution. In its latest report, Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan, the International Crisis Group examines the extensive CIA-led program of drone strikes in Pakistan. The report argues that the U.S. needs to be transparent about its drone policies and bring them in accord with legality and enhanced congressional oversight and judicial accountability, while Pakistan must live up to its responsibility for governance and security in FATA. The report’s major findings and recommendations are: Pakistan’s new civilian leadership under PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif must make the extension of the state’s writ in FATA the centrepiece of its counter-terrorism agenda, bringing violent extremists to justice and thus diminishing Washington’s perceived need to conduct drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal belt. Drones are not a long-term solution to the problem they are being deployed to address, since the jihadi groups in FATA will continue to recruit as long as the region remains an ungoverned no-man’s land. The U.S., while pressuring the Pakistan military to end all support to violent extremists, should also support civilian efforts to bring FATA into the constitutional and legal mainstream. The lack of candour from the U.S. and Pakistan governments on the drone program undermines efforts to assess its legality or its full impact on FATA’s population. The U.S. refuses to officially acknowledge the program; Pakistan portrays it as a violation of national sovereignty, but ample evidence exists of tacit Pakistani consent and, at times, active cooperation. Pakistan must ensure that its actions and those of the U.S. comply with the principles of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law. Independent observers should have access to targeted areas, where significant military and militant-imposed barriers have made accurate assessments of the program’s impact, including collateral damage, nearly impossible. The U.S. should cease any practices, such as “signature strikes”, that do not comply with international humanitarian law. The U.S. should develop a legal framework that defines clear roles for the executive, legislative and judicial branches, converting the drone program from a covert CIA operation to a military-run program with a meaningful level of judicial and Congressional oversight. “The core of any Pakistani counter-terrorism strategy in this area should be to incorporate FATA into the country’s legal and constitutional mainstream”, says Samina Ahmed, Crisis Group’s Senior Asia Adviser. “For Pakistan, the solution lies in overhauling an anachronistic governance system so as to establish fundamental constitutional rights and genuine political enfranchisement in FATA, along with a state apparatus capable of upholding the rule of law and bringing violent extremists to justice”. FULL REPORT

Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan

Islamabad/Washington/Brussels  |   21 May 2013

Drone strikes alone will not eliminate the jihadi threat in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Extension of Pakistani law and full constitutional rights to the region is the only long-term solution.

In its latest report, Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan, the International Crisis Group examines the extensive CIA-led program of drone strikes in Pakistan. The report argues that the U.S. needs to be transparent about its drone policies and bring them in accord with legality and enhanced congressional oversight and judicial accountability, while Pakistan must live up to its responsibility for governance and security in FATA.

The report’s major findings and recommendations are:

“The core of any Pakistani counter-terrorism strategy in this area should be to incorporate FATA into the country’s legal and constitutional mainstream”, says Samina Ahmed, Crisis Group’s Senior Asia Adviser. “For Pakistan, the solution lies in overhauling an anachronistic governance system so as to establish fundamental constitutional rights and genuine political enfranchisement in FATA, along with a state apparatus capable of upholding the rule of law and bringing violent extremists to justice”.

FULL REPORT

May 20

humanrightswatch: Women and girls share a lighter moment at the Doro refugee camp in Maban, Upper Nile state in South Sudan.  © 2012 Samer Muscati/Human Rights Watch

humanrightswatch:

Women and girls share a lighter moment at the Doro refugee camp in Maban, Upper Nile state in South Sudan. 

© 2012 Samer Muscati/Human Rights Watch

Our President, Louise Arbour, signed this open letter, calling for the end of the taboo “that blocked for so long the debate on more humane and efficient drug policy”. Read in full on the Guardian. Photo: Flickr/UN Photo Geneva

Our President, Louise Arbour, signed this open letter, calling for the end of the taboo “that blocked for so long the debate on more humane and efficient drug policy”. Read in full on the Guardian.

Photo: Flickr/UN Photo Geneva

[video]

May 16

The Flawed Logic Behind Beijing’s Senkaku/Diaoyu Policy | The Diplomat By Yaping Wang Beijing has responded to Japan’s recent nationalization of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, with activities on the ground (or water) designed to undermine Japan’s de-facto control of the islands. Beijing’s actions were rightly captured as “reactive assertiveness” by an International Crisis Group report, where “[China] exploits perceived provocations in disputed areas by other countries to take strong countermeasures to change the status quo in its favor.” By inducing costs on the ground, Beijing’s goal is to make Tokyo recognize the existence of the dispute and agree to negotiate. However, this “reactive assertive” approach makes flawed calculations of risks and gains. Beijing does have some logical reasons to pursue this course. One, inaction would be difficult to reconcile with boiling domestic nationalism. Two, Japan’s control of the islands does not give Tokyo any motive to recognize the existence of the dispute, much less the willingness to negotiate. Unless China gains some leverage vis-à-vis Japan, chances are thin that this issue will ever even reach the negotiating table. Three, Japan’s initial provocation may have inflamed China, but it offered Beijing the chance to retaliate by challenging Japan’s de-facto control of the islands while still claiming the moral high ground. Four, the economic ties between China and Japan, as well as U.S. interests, seem strong enough to keep potential armed conflicts at bay. To the extent that the U.S. is involved, its interests in these tiny, uninhabited rocks are marginal. Although its security treaty obligations with Japan bind it to action should the islands be attacked, the U.S. will attempt to deter the use of force. Finally, a strong and consistent response would effectively showcase to China’s other disputants, in the South China Sea for example, its resolve to defend its position in territorial disputes.   FULL ARTICLE (The Diplomat) Photo: Flickr/Al Jazeera English

The Flawed Logic Behind Beijing’s Senkaku/Diaoyu Policy | The Diplomat

By Yaping Wang

Beijing has responded to Japan’s recent nationalization of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, with activities on the ground (or water) designed to undermine Japan’s de-facto control of the islands. Beijing’s actions were rightly captured as “reactive assertiveness” by an International Crisis Group report, where “[China] exploits perceived provocations in disputed areas by other countries to take strong countermeasures to change the status quo in its favor.”

By inducing costs on the ground, Beijing’s goal is to make Tokyo recognize the existence of the dispute and agree to negotiate. However, this “reactive assertive” approach makes flawed calculations of risks and gains.

Beijing does have some logical reasons to pursue this course. One, inaction would be difficult to reconcile with boiling domestic nationalism. Two, Japan’s control of the islands does not give Tokyo any motive to recognize the existence of the dispute, much less the willingness to negotiate. Unless China gains some leverage vis-à-vis Japan, chances are thin that this issue will ever even reach the negotiating table. Three, Japan’s initial provocation may have inflamed China, but it offered Beijing the chance to retaliate by challenging Japan’s de-facto control of the islands while still claiming the moral high ground. Four, the economic ties between China and Japan, as well as U.S. interests, seem strong enough to keep potential armed conflicts at bay. To the extent that the U.S. is involved, its interests in these tiny, uninhabited rocks are marginal. Although its security treaty obligations with Japan bind it to action should the islands be attacked, the U.S. will attempt to deter the use of force. Finally, a strong and consistent response would effectively showcase to China’s other disputants, in the South China Sea for example, its resolve to defend its position in territorial disputes.  

FULL ARTICLE (The Diplomat)

Photo: Flickr/Al Jazeera English

Venezuela: A House Divided Caracas/Bogotá/Brussels  |   16 May 2013 Legal challenges to the close 14 April presidential election and the government’s reluctance to commit to a full review cast a shadow over the sustainability of the new administration in an already deeply polarised Venezuela. Venezuela: A House Divided, the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the presidential election triggered by the death of President Hugo Chávez. Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s chosen successor, won by a margin of less than 1.5 per cent over Henrique Capriles of the Democratic Unity alliance. The opposition has claimed irregularities and filed a court challenge after the electoral commission refused to conduct a full audit. The judiciary and other key institutions have been hollowed out in the fourteen years of Chávez’s rule, creating uncertainty about whether the transition to the post-Chávez era can be accomplished smoothly. The briefing’s major findings and recommendations are: An already polarised country is now clearly divided into two almost equal sides that appear irreconcilable. Dialogue and reconciliation are essential to maintain stability, but doubts surrounding the election must be clarified for this to happen. The power vacuum produced by Chávez’s death is a source of potential instability. An extremely personalised political regime has been replaced by an unpredictable collection of group and even individual interests. The Chávez government dismantled important elements of democracy and the rule of law over the past fourteen years, and the costs are now being paid by the population, with homicide rates among the highest in the world and rising economic dislocation. Venezuela’s government should recognise that the sharp division of the electorate necessitates consensus building, not a partisan agenda. It should build bridges to the opposition, the private sector and civil society, conduct dialogue to reduce tensions and avoid violence. The international community has been mostly indifferent or silent about the deterioration of democracy and rule of law in Venezuela. It is time for stronger messages, particularly from neighbours and partners such as Brazil and regional organisations, regarding the need to avoid regional instability by resolving the political impasse peacefully and promoting democracy, rule of law and human rights, as well as offering mediation assistance if requested. “There is a potentially dangerous gulf between the regime’s insistence that the election result be recognised as a condition for accepting the opposition, and the opposition’s understandable insistence that it can accept the election results only after a full and transparent review”, says Javier Ciurlizza, Crisis Group’s Latin America and Caribbean Program Director. “If the worst is to be avoided, the moderates (or pragmatists) on both sides need to find a way to bridge that chasm”. “Venezuela urgently needs to reconstruct its social and political fabric in the post-Chávez era”, says Mark Schneider, Vice President and Special Adviser on Latin America. “It needs to avoid political violence and accept democratic checks and balances in addressing the huge challenges of crime and economic deterioration”.  FULL BRIEFING

Venezuela: A House Divided

Caracas/Bogotá/Brussels  |   16 May 2013

Legal challenges to the close 14 April presidential election and the government’s reluctance to commit to a full review cast a shadow over the sustainability of the new administration in an already deeply polarised Venezuela.

Venezuela: A House Divided, the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the presidential election triggered by the death of President Hugo Chávez. Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s chosen successor, won by a margin of less than 1.5 per cent over Henrique Capriles of the Democratic Unity alliance. The opposition has claimed irregularities and filed a court challenge after the electoral commission refused to conduct a full audit. The judiciary and other key institutions have been hollowed out in the fourteen years of Chávez’s rule, creating uncertainty about whether the transition to the post-Chávez era can be accomplished smoothly.

The briefing’s major findings and recommendations are:

“There is a potentially dangerous gulf between the regime’s insistence that the election result be recognised as a condition for accepting the opposition, and the opposition’s understandable insistence that it can accept the election results only after a full and transparent review”, says Javier Ciurlizza, Crisis Group’s Latin America and Caribbean Program Director. “If the worst is to be avoided, the moderates (or pragmatists) on both sides need to find a way to bridge that chasm”.

“Venezuela urgently needs to reconstruct its social and political fabric in the post-Chávez era”, says Mark Schneider, Vice President and Special Adviser on Latin America. “It needs to avoid political violence and accept democratic checks and balances in addressing the huge challenges of crime and economic deterioration”. 

FULL BRIEFING

May 15

Kenya After the Elections Nairobi/Brussels  |   15 May 2013 Though the 2013 general elections were relatively peaceful, Kenya is still deeply divided and ethnically polarised. Kenya After the Elections, the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group,examines the 4 March elections that saw Jubilee Coalition’s Uhuru Kenyatta declared president. Despite various shortcomings and allegations of irregularities, Kenyans averted a repeat of the 2007-2008 post-election violence. However, the conflict drivers that triggered the 2007 bloodshed, including a culture of impunity, land grievances, corruption, ethnic tensions, weak institutions and regional and socio-economic inequality,have yet to be addressed adequately. The briefing’s major findings and recommendations are: The government needs to restore confidence in theelectoral machinery, which was undermined by technical failures in electronic voting and questions over the transparency of the tallying process. Domestically, implementing devolution presents a crucial test, both in ensuring Kenya’s counties do not become “ethnic fiefdoms” and are inclusive of minority interests, and that they have adequate financial support despite the country’s current fiscal deficit. Internationally, the new government will need to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) as the cases against the new president and deputy president for their alleged roles in the 2007 election violence proceed. Failure to do so will strain international relations, to the detriment of Kenya’s economy and its people. Despite the strength of the Jubilee Coalition in the legislatures, the opposition needs to regroup under strong leadership to represent fully the more than five million voters who supported it. “Maintaining the status quo is simply not an option for a still divided Kenya”, says Cedric Barnes, Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Project Director. “The ICC cases, a disappointed and bitter opposition and the implementation of an untested system of devolved governance remain significant challenges for the new government”. “The new government has the opportunity to usher in an era of peace and socio-economic development that would benefit all communities and unite the country”, says EJ Hogendoorn, Crisis Group’s Africa Program Deputy Director. “The foundation has been laid with the overwhelming support the constitution received in 2010, a base that should be maintained and built upon for a peaceful and prosperous future”. FULL BRIEFING

Kenya After the Elections

Nairobi/Brussels  |   15 May 2013

Though the 2013 general elections were relatively peaceful, Kenya is still deeply divided and ethnically polarised.

Kenya After the Elections, the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group,examines the 4 March elections that saw Jubilee Coalition’s Uhuru Kenyatta declared president. Despite various shortcomings and allegations of irregularities, Kenyans averted a repeat of the 2007-2008 post-election violence. However, the conflict drivers that triggered the 2007 bloodshed, including a culture of impunity, land grievances, corruption, ethnic tensions, weak institutions and regional and socio-economic inequality,have yet to be addressed adequately.

The briefing’s major findings and recommendations are:

“Maintaining the status quo is simply not an option for a still divided Kenya”, says Cedric Barnes, Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Project Director. “The ICC cases, a disappointed and bitter opposition and the implementation of an untested system of devolved governance remain significant challenges for the new government”.

“The new government has the opportunity to usher in an era of peace and socio-economic development that would benefit all communities and unite the country”, says EJ Hogendoorn, Crisis Group’s Africa Program Deputy Director. “The foundation has been laid with the overwhelming support the constitution received in 2010, a base that should be maintained and built upon for a peaceful and prosperous future”.

FULL BRIEFING

May 14

“This last incident on Saturday was the last in a string of incidents that directly affected Turkey’s security and the lives of Turkish civilians. So it definitely demonstrates the risks involved, for Turkey, in supporting Syrian opposition and being involved in Syria’s crisis.” — Listen to Didem Collinsworth, Crisis Group’s Turkey Analyst, talk about Syrian–Turkish border clashes on FSRN.